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IT'S NOT BLACK AND WHITE: SPENCER v.
CASAVILLA* AND THE USE OF THE RIGHT OF
INTRASTATE TRAVEL IN SECTION 1985(3)
INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit's decision in Spencer v. Casavilla recog-
nized the right of intrastate travel and allowed it to be used for
the first time in the context of a civil rights claim under title 42,
section 1985(3).' Regrettably, the court did not identify the
source of this right, and the failure to do so affects the civil
rights statute in a way unrecognized by the court's decision. If
the Second Circuit had deemed the source of the right of intra-
state travel to be the Fourteenth Amendment, then the court
should have required a showing of "state action" in order to es-
tablish the violation of an independent constitutional right that
section 1985(3) requires. 2 Because the court did not investigate
the source of the intrastate right, it did not require such state
* 903 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990) (before Kearse, Cardamone & Mahoney, JJ.; opinion
per Kearse, J.).
1 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguie on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the pur-
pose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Ter-
ritory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the
equal protection of the laws . .. in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depri-
vation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
The language of the statute requires a conspiratorial purpose to deprive persons of equal
protection or privileges and immunities, and therefore a claim under § 1985(3) requires
an allegation that some independent constitutional right was violated.
See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), and discussion at notes 242-50 and
accompanying text infra.
In Spencer, since there was no state action, either alleged by the plaintiffs or appar-
ent from the facts, the plaintiffs' claim should have been dismissed unless the Second
Circuit determined that the right of intrastate travel is additionally secured against dep-
rivation by purely private parties.
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action, and the court's action was therefore an invitation to im-
properly founded causes of action.
Aside from causing confusion for law review commentators,3
the lack of a designated source for the right to travel has not
been particularly troublesome. However, now that the right of
intrastate travel is being asserted as a right protected by the
federal Constitution, lower courts need the guidance they have
lacked in the past. The courts cannot protect the right of intra-
state travel within the bounds of precedent without afdesignated
constitutional source for that right.
An extensive analysis of Spencer and the confusing body of
law surrounding both section 1985(3) and the right to travel
leads to the proposition that state action was indeed a required
component of the plaintiffs' claim. Furthermore, since there was
no such showing, this would require the dismissal of the Spen-
cers' case. Such a result seems particularly undesirable in a case
that has all the hallmarks of racial violence which section
1985(3) was designed to remedy.4 Therefore, the time has come
for the Supreme Court to clear up the confusion surrounding the
possible existence of a federally protected right of intrastate
travel and to settle once and for all how section 1985(3) can be
used to combat the racial violence it was designed to prevent.
The Court must reach a result that does not classify every con-
frontation between people of different races as one of federal
constitutional proportions.
This Comment will focus first on the right to travel and de-
termine that the source of a federal right of intrastate travel can
be found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The analysis will then turn to the Civil Rights Act under which
the plaintiffs in Spencer filed suit. An examination of the stat-
ute, its history, and its connection with the right to travel will
show that the right of intrastate travel cannot be asserted under
3 See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomeless" Laws: Ordinances
Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 75
CALnM. L. REv. 595 (1989) [hereinafter Antihomeless]; Comment, Intrastate Residence
Requirements for Welfare and the Right to Intrastate Travel, 8 HAnv. C.R.-CL. L. REv.
591, 602 (1973) [hereinafter Intrastate Residence]; Comment, The Right to Travel: In
Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 Nun. L. REV. 116 (1975) [hereinafter Right to
Travel].
" In Spencer a black man died as a result of a brutal beating by four white men. 903
F.2d at 172. See notes 193-201 and accompanying text infra.
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section 1985(3) without a showing of state action. Therefore, this
Comment concludes that Spencer v. Casavilla was wrongly
decided.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. The District Court Decision
Spencer v. Casavilla arose from an attack on Samuel Benja-
min Spencer, a twenty-year-old black resident of Westchester
County, New York." The attack, which resulted in Spencer's
death, occurred on May 28, 1986, in Kings County, New York.'
Four white residents of Kings County were charged and subse-
quently convicted in connection with Spencer's death.7
The plaintiffs in Spencer were the parents of the decedent.
They filed a civil complaint alleging that the defendants individ-
ually and in concert had deprived Spencer of certain constitu-
tional rights otherwise protected under the Civil Rights Act, sec-
tions 1981,8 1985(3) and 1986,9 and by state law.10 Plaintiffs
5 903 F.2d at 172.
6 Id. In the early morning hours of May 28, Spencer, who was walking on the public
streets in Coney Island, was "savagely punched and kicked, beaten with a baseball bat,
and repeatedly stabbed with a knife." Id.
Id. Douglas Mackey pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter in the first degree
and cooperated with the prosecution. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1987). Frank
Casavilla pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15-years-to-life.
N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.25 (McKinney 1987). Cosino Muriale pleaded guilty to first-degree
manslaughter and received an 8 -to-15-year prison sentence. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.20
(McKinney 1987). Frank D'Antonio was found guilty, after a jury trial, of third-degree
assault and received a one-year sentence of imprisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.00
(McKinney 1987). See also Spencer, 903 F.2d at 172.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and no other.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be
done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed,
and having power to prevent and or aid in preventing the commission of the
same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be
liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused
by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have
prevented.
10 Spencer v. Casavilla, 717 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The plaintiffs al-
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sought compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of their
son for his pain and suffering and on behalf of themselves for
the loss of their son.1'
Since the defendants were without counsel, District Judge
Haight raised, sua sponte, the question of federal jurisdiction. 12
The court first concluded that the plaintiffs' claim under section
1981 was not viable.'" The district court next turned to section
1985(3) as a possible source of federal jurisdiction. 14
The court applied the test established by the Supreme
Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge'6 to determine whether the
plaintiffs had a cause of action under section 1985(3)."° This
four-part test requires a plaintiff to allege (1) a conspiracy; (2)
that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive a person or
class of the equal protection of, or the privileges and immunities
under, the laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspir-
acy; and (4) an injury to plaintiff's person or property or a depri-
vation of a right or privilege of United States citizenship. 17 Since
section 1985(3) does not confer any independent substantive
rights, plaintiffs must allege the deprivation of a right elsewhere
guaranteed by the Constitution. 8
The district court referred to the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Stevens v. Tillman"e for three types of rights that are actiona-
leged that defendants' actions violated state assault and murder laws. Id. at 1062. The
plaintiffs also alleged that defendants violated Spencer's rights under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 903 F.2d at 172. However, the Second Circuit chose not to discuss this
claim since it found for the plaintiffs on their § 1985(3) claim which asserted the depri.
vation of the right of intrastate travel.
" Spencer, 903 F.2d at 172. The defendants were the same four men who were crim.
inally prosecuted and convicted in connection with Spencer's death. The complaint also
included as defendants unidentified "John Does." 717 F. Supp. at 1058. None of the four
defendants were represented by counsel during the civil proceedings. Id.
12 Spencer, 717 F. Supp. at 1058.
12 Judge Haight determined that the plaintiffs had not alleged the state action nec-
essary to support a claim under the relevant clauses of § 1981. Id. at 1058-59.
'" Id. at 1060.
15 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Griffin several white men (defendants) stopped and physi.
cally harassed several black men (plaintiffs). The plaintiffs were successful in their §
1985(3) suit in which they alleged, among other things, a conspiracy by defendants to
deprive them of their right to travel interstate. See text accompanying notes 219-20
infra.
11 Spencer, 717 F. Supp. at 1060.
17 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03.
"' Great Am. Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979). See
notes 240-41 and accompanying text infra.
29 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988).
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ble under section 1985(3). The court showed that the plaintiffs
did not assert one of these rights.21 The first possibility, that the
rights allegedly infringed were based in federal law, was rejected;
the district court determined that there were no allegations im-
plicating a federally created or protected right.22 The second
possibility, that the right was founded in state law but the dep-
rivation of that right interfered with a federal right, was also
rejected.2 The district court pointed out that the complaint
clearly alleged a violation of state assault and murder laws but
did not allege how this conduct in turn "offended a federal con-
stitutional or statutory rule designed for the protection of all. 24
Lastly, the court noted that, under Stevens, the right could be
one that was protected only against governmental action .2 How-
ever, such cases require that defendants be state actors or actors
influencing the state.26 In Spencer the defendants were private
actors. Thus, the court disposed of the possible sources for rights
infringed by conspiracies under section 1985(3) and found that
the plaintiffs could not rely on that statute for federal jurisdic-
20 In Stevens a white principal sued the black president of a parent-teacher associa-
tion under § 1985(3) with a "type three" claim that the defendants influenced the board
of education, a state actor, in its plot to have her removed. As articulated by the Stevens
court, the three types of conduct reached by § 1985(3) are:
1. Racially-motivated private conspiracies to deprive persons of rights secured
to all by federal law ....
2. Racially-motivated private conspiracies to deprive persons of rights secured
to all by state law, where the deprivation interferes with the exercise of a
federally-protected right ....
3. Racially-motivated conspiracies to deprive persons of rights secured only
against governmental action... provided the defendants are either "state
actors" or seeking to influence the state to act in a prohibited way.
Id. at 404 (citations omitted).
32 Spencer, 717 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061. Judge Haight contrasted the present case with Griffin, where a con-
spiracy violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal right of interstate travel.
The district court did not explicitly address the possibility that the violation of the
plaintiffs' right to travel intrastate was actionable under § 1985(3). Instead it simply
stated that the plaintiffs' case did not fit into one of the acceptable categories of cases.
Therefore the court's decision implied that the right to travel intrastate was either not a
federally protected right, or it was one that required a showing of state action, which was
not present in this case.
"' Id.
2" Id. at 1062.
25 As an example, the Seventh Circuit suggested that conduct which infringed on
the right of free speech granted in the First Amendment would satisfy the third option.




tion.27 Therefore, the court concluded that the complaint had to
be dismissed either for lack of federal jurisdiction or for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.28
B. The Second Circuit Decision
Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.29 The Second Circuit examined the complaint
and determined that because it was not frivolous, there was fed-
eral jurisdiction even if the claim would be subsequently dis-
missed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.30 The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Kearse,
then examined the section 1985(3) claim and found it to be
actionable.'
According to the court, the plaintiffs' allegations that the
defendants conspired with racially discriminatory animus to vio-
late the decedent's right of intrastate travel easily satisfied the
criteria established in Griffin.32 Without going into the same
amount of detail as the district court had, the Second Circuit
explained that a section 1985(3) claim had to assert the depriva-
tion of a right covered by the "Constitution or other law." 3 The
court then stated that the right to travel intrastate satisfied this
requirement and cited Carpenters v. Scott.34 Although the Su-
27 Spencer, 717 F. Supp. at 1062.
28 Id. The district court did not explicitly choose one of these reasons as the ground
for dismissal, apparently because either was sufficient. The § 1986 claim was addressed
in a footnote in which the district court found that without a valid § 1985 claim there
could be no § 1986 claim, because § 1986 provides a remedy for unrecognized violations
of § 1985. Id. at 1062 n.1.
2 Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990).
30 Id. at 173 ("The court should not dismiss a complaint asserting a non-frivolous
claim under federal law for lack of jurisdiction even if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.").
21 Id. at 174.
32 Id. See also notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
"Racial animus," an element of a § 1985(3) claim, refers to the "invidiously discrimi-
natory motivation" of the conspirators. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-03.
22 Spencer, 903 F.2d at 174.
4 463 U.S. 825 (1983). The plaintiffs in Carpenters brought a § 1985(3) claim alleg-
ing a conspiracy aimed at depriving them of their First Amendment rights. Id. at 830.
This is a "type three" claim under Stevens. See note 20 supra. The plaintiffs' claim
failed because they did not prove involvement by the state as is required when asserting




preme Court denied the plaintiffs' claim in Carpenters, the
Court explicitly reaffirmed the rule set forth in Griffin that a
section 1985(3) claim could be successful in some purely private
conspiracy cases 3 5 Noting that the Supreme Court has only
dealt with a private conspiracy to deprive someone of the right
of interstate travel in Griffin, the Second Circuit then held that
the same analysis applies to intrastate travel.30
The court relied on another Second Circuit case, King v.
New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority,37 for the existence
of the right of intrastate travel. King upheld the invalidation of
a durational residence requirement for receiving public hous-
ing.38 Because some of the plaintiffs in King had moved to New
Rochelle from elsewhere in New York, as opposed to emigrating
from another state, the King court had to address the issue of
intrastate travel. The King court found .that it would be "mean-
ingless to describe the right to travel between states as a funda-
mental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a cor-
relative constitutional right to travel within a state."3 9
Consequently, King stands for the proposition that the Consti-
tution also protects the right of intrastate travel.40 Furthermore,
the Second Circuit found that the Supreme Court, by choosing
not to determine the precise source of the right to travel, had
deliberately left open the possibility of a right of intrastate
The Spencer court cited to the portion of the Carpenters opinion in which the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin that § 1985(3) protects against purely pri-
vate conspiracies to bolster its holding that state action was not a required component of
the Spencers' claim. Spencer, 903 F.2d at 174 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105 and
Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-35).
35 Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-33. The Carpenters Court pointed out that under
Griffin a § 1985(3) claim alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of certain federally
protected rights does not require a showing of state action if those rights are protected
against private interference. Id. at 833. The rights asserted by the Griffin plaintiffs, the
right of interstate travel and the rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, are such pri-
vately actionable rights. Id.
Spencer, 903 F.2d at 174-75.
442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (A five-year resi-
dency requirement for admission to public housing was held to violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Constitution because it impermissibly burdened the fundamental right
of intrastate travel.).
3s Id.
39 Id. at 648.
40 Spencer, 903 F.2d at 174. The Spencer court cited King and sid, "our Court has




travel.41 This invitation allowed the Second Circuit to use King
to fill in the gap left open by the Supreme Court. The Spencer
court thus concluded that the plaintiffs' assertion that they were
denied the right of intrastate travel qualified as a claim that a
constitutionally protected right had been denied.42 Moreover, ac-
cording to the court, the plaintiffs were not required to allege
state action because the right to travel had been used success-
fully in Griffin against private defendants in a section 1985(3)
claim.43 In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs
had an actionable claim under section 1985(3).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sources for the Right of Interstate Travel44
Even though the Supreme Court has officially recognized
4, Id. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969) ("We have no
occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitu-
tional provision.").
42 Spencer, 903 F.2d at 175. This claim is a type-one claim under the Stevens
model. See note 20 supra.
41 Id. at 175 (A plaintiff can satisfy the requirements of § 1985(3) "by alleging that
private defendants have . . . violated his constitutional right to travel within a given
state.") (emphasis added).
Remember, however, that Griffin involved the right of interstate travel and Spencer
involves the right of intrastate travel. See note 15 supra. This distinction is important
because the two rights need not come from the same constitutional source, and therefore
the right of interstate travel can be asserted without alleging state action, while the right
of intrastate travel may require a showing of state action.
4 Historically, the right of interstate travel has roots that predate not only the
United States Constitution, but also the New World. For example, the Magna Carta
guaranteed "free passage into and out of the realm." MAGNA CARTA ch. 42 (1215). On this
continent the right appeared in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. PA. CONST. of
1776 ch. 1, para. XV. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation explicitly provided for
the right with this language: "The free inhabitants of these states ... shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people
of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state . .. .
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
When the Framers drafted the United States Constitution as a replacement for the
Articles of Confederation, they did not mention the right to travel. See United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("Although the Articles of Confederation provided [for
the right of interstate travel,] that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution.").
Yet, since no one would doubt that citizens of the United States are afforded the right of
interstate travel, the right must be implicit in the Constitution. See notes 52-116 and
accompanying text infra for discussion of possible constitutional sources. The notions of
federalism that the Framers were seeking to protect in the Constitution provide addi-
tional support for the existence of a right of interstate travel. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 758
(suggesting that the reason the right does not appear in the Constitution is that it was
[Vol. 67: 473
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the existence of the right of interstate travel," it has declined to
find a source for this right.4" For the purposes of this Comment,
however, it is important to determine from which constitutional
provision the right of interstate travel originates in order to find
the source of the right of intrastate travel.
The Supreme Court has not yet directly answered the ques-
tion whether there is a constitutionally protected right of intra-
state travel. In United States v. Guest'7 the Court referred to
the "right to travel from one state to another" and also to the
"freedom to travel throughout the United States."48 The latter
suggests that the right to travel could include intrastate travel.
For this reason, and because the only Supreme Court precedents
available deal explicitly with the right to travel interstate, an
analysis of the possible sources of the right of interstate travel
sheds light on the possible sources for an intrastate right.49 Fur-
considered so elementary that it "was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.").
After the ratification of the Constitution, the apparent absence of a textual source
for the right to travel was not the source of much controversy. Indeed the right of inter-
state travel did not receive judicial recognition until 1823 when Justice Washington, act-
ing as circuit court judge, mentioned it in dicta in Corfield v. Coryel. 6 F. Cas. 546.
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230). Finally, in 1849, the right to travel was approved by the
Supreme Court in Smith v. Turner, The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492
(1849) ("We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same commu-
nity, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interrup-
tion, as freely as in our own States."). For further discusion of the early history of the
right of interstate travel, see Antihomeless, supra note 3, at 606.
5 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41 Id. at 630. In Shapiro the Court addressed whether deterring the immigration of
indigents was a constitutionally permissible purpose of Connecticut, Pennsylvania and
District of Columbia statutes that denied welfare benefits to people who had resided in
the jurisdiction for less than one year. Id. at 631. Since the Court determined that such
statutes deterred interstate travel, the Court needed only to decide whether interstate
travel is constitutionally protected. Quoting language from United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), see note 93 infra, the Court found that the right to travel interstate had
such a long history of recognition that it was unnecessary to ascribe a specific source to
the right. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31. Thus the Court was able to say. "We have no
occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular provision."
Id.
47 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
48 Guest, 383 U.S. at 757, 758. In Guest the complainants alleged among other
things that "defendants conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Negro citi-
zens of the United States in the free exercise and enjoyment of" the right of interstate
travel. Id. at 757.
4" While the possible sources for interstate and intrastate travel rights are identical,
and while it is also possible that the interstate right includes the intrastate right, nothing
precludes the concept of independent sources for each of these rights.
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thermore, the sources of these rights are important because they
determine whether the rights are secured against governmental
or private interference and therefore whether state action must
be asserted when claiming a violation of either of these rights.0
1. Article IV, Section 2: The Privileges & Immunities
Clause51
There are six constitutional sources that are most fre-
quently linked to the right of interstate travel.5 2 The Privileges
and Immunities Clause of article IV, section 2 was the most
likely source at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, and
it is still the source of preference for some today. 3
Historically, the Privileges and Immunities Clause in article
IV, section 2 has been an appealing basis for the right to travel,
since it was intended as the Constitution's equivalent of article
IV of the Articles of Confederation.5 4 Because the Articles of
Confederation explicitly granted all inhabitants of the states the
50 See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit in
Lutz was searching for the source of a right to travel intrastate to determine whether a
city ordinance outlawing repeated driving around local roads ("cruising") infringed on
any constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 256. The court pointed out that the source of
the right to travel intrastate could determine whether state action must be alleged when
asserting a violation of this right. Specifically, the court referred to the Fourteenth
Amendment, noting that rights created by this amendment are protected only against
infringement by state actors. Id. at 264. However, the court said that the rights of na-
tional citizenship, which are protected but not created by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause are protected against infringement by purely private
actors as well. See notes 63-69 and accompanying text infra. The Lutz court concluded
that the source of the right of intrastate travel is the Fourteenth Amendment's Duo
Process Clause. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267. This court did not have to identify the source for
the right of interstate travel since that issue was not before the court.
81 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." US. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
82 The six possibilities are: (1) article IV, section 2, (2) Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause, (3) Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, (4)
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, (5) article I, section 8 (the "Commerce Clause")
and (6) no particular source.
53 An early case that found the right of interstate travel to be protected by article
IV, section 2 was Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) ("[T]he [Privi-
leges and Immunities] clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of
a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union."). Recently, Justice
O'Connor resurrected the Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV, section 2 as her
choice for the embodiment of the right of interstate travel. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55, 71 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J. concurring); See Intrastate Residence, supra
note 3, at 602.
[Vol. 57: 473
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right "to free ingress and regress to and from any other state,' 'e5
the constitutional provision that was supposed to replace the Ar-
ticles of Confederation provision must also have included such a
right to travel. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Wheeler56 defined the origins and purposes of the clause when
it reasoned:
That the Constitution plainly intended to preserve and enforce the
limitation as to discrimination imposed upon the States by Article IV
of the Articles of Confederation, and thus necessarily assumed the
continued possession by the States of the reserved power to deal with
free residence, ingress and egress, cannot be denied for the following
reasons: (1) Because the text of Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution,
makes manifest that it was drawn with reference to the corresponding
clause of the Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetu-
ate its limitations; and (2) because that view has been so conclusively
settled as to leave no room for controversy.57
This argument comports with the Framers' federalist concerns
while drafting the Constitution.'
The early cases discussing the right to travel ascribe the
right's origins to article IV of the Constitution. The court in
Corfield v. Coryel 59 defined the privileges and immunities of cit-
izens in the several states as follows:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental .... The
A5 AirrICs OF CoNmERATioN art. IV.
E254 U.S. 281 (1920).
'7 Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920). Admittedly, an argument can be made that the
Framers' failure to include explicitly the right to travel in the Constitution represents
their intent to exclude deliberately the right from federal protection. However, the ab-
sence of the right to travel interstate would be abhorrent to the Union the Framers were
creating and, aside from the conspicuous absence of the right to travel from the Consti-
tution, no authority exists to support the concept that the Framers wanted to exclude
this right. Evidence for the inclusion of the right to travel in article IV, section 2 dates
back to 1787 when Charles Pinckney submitted a pamphlet to the federal convention
describing article IV, section 2 as follows:
The 4th article, respecting the extending the rights of the Citizens of each
State, throughout the United States; the delivery of fugitives from justice,
upon demand, and the giving full faith and credit to the records and proceed-
ings of each, is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the
present Confederation, except with this difference, that the demand of the Ex-
ecutive of a State, for any fugitive, criminal offender, shall be complied with.
3 M. FAmuAN, RcoRDs OF anM FEDMA CoNVEloN OF 1787 112 (1934).
"See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
" 6 F.Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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right of a citizen of the state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or other-
wise .... may be mentioned as [one] of the particular privileges and
immunities of citizens, which [is] clearly embraced by the general
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental .... 00
From Corfield it seems that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause was thought to be an independent source of fundamental
rights. Similarly, Ward v. Maryland"1 found that the clause
"secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass
into any other State of the Union ... without molestation. '0 2
However, subsequent cases, especially the Slaughter House
Cases,63 indicated that the clause is not a source of fundamental
rights but rather is designed to protect certain federalist antidis-
crimination notions.6 4 This concept predates the Slaughter
House Cases as seen in Paul v. Virginia"5 where the Supreme
Court said that the purpose of the clause was to "place the citi-
zens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in
10 Id. at 551-52. (The district court held that New Jersey could prohibit nonresi-
dents from raking oysters in New Jersey.). The dictum said that the Privileges and Im.
munities Clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution would prevent New Jersey
from prohibiting interstate travel itself. See Right to Travel, supra note 3, at 118.
64 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871) (holding unconstitutional under article IV, section 2
Maryland statute requiring nonresidents to obtain licenses to sell goods in the state).
2 Id. at 430.
" The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (The Supreme Court
referred to the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in article IV, section 2
in order to shed light on the meaning of the same clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment.).
" Id. at 77. Article IV, section 2 protects the federalist concepts inherent in a union
of states by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of state citizenship. The Slaughter
House Cases were the first to hold definitively that the clause insures that each state
treats equally its citizens and noncitizens present in the state:
[Article IV, section 2] did not create those rights which it called privileges and
immunities of citizens of the States ....
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those
rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or
qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor
less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your
jurisdiction.
Id.
The modem interpretation of the clause is consistent with the view in the Slaughter
House Cases. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
See also Intrastate Residence, supra note 3, at 603.
65 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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those States are concerned."66 Moreover, the privileges and im-
munities secured to the citizens of the several states by the pro-
vision were said to be those that the citizens of each state enjoy
because of their state citizenship. 7 In other words, citizens of
the United States who are in a specific state but who are not
citizens of that state are entitled to the same treatment afforded
to the citizens of that state. Toomer v. Witsell5 clarified this
notion by saying that the object of the clause was simply "to
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy. ' '6 9
The view that the right to travel comes from article IV, sec-
tion 2, has fallen somewhat into disfavor.70 While the current
" Id. at 180. Paul held constitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
article IV, section 2 a Virginia statute requiring insurance companies not incorporated
under Virginia law to obtain a license in order to carry on business in the state. The
Virginia statute did not discriminate against out-of-state corporations because corpora-
tions are granted their existence by their state of incorporation. Other states may choose
whether or not to recognize the existence of out-of-state corporations. Id. at 181. Since
the Privileges and Immunities Clause in article IV, section 2 does not mean that citizens
of one state carry their privileges of state citizenship with them into another state, the
clause does not guarantee the effect of out-of-state incorporation in another state. Id. By
requiring a license, Virginia simply required the corporation's existence to be recognized
in Virginia to the same extent that Virginia recognized businesses incorporated in Vir-
ginia. Id. The state did not treat its own corporations better that those incorporated
elsewhere and therefore did not violate the Constitution. See id. at 180-81.
67 Id.
- 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
61 Id. at 395. Toomer held that a state statute requiring nonresidents engaged in
shrimp fishing in South Carolina waters to pay a licensing fee 100 times greater than
that paid by residents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause in article IV, sec-
tion 2. The Court said the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause "is to outlaw
classifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate
that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed."
Id. at 398. -
70 For an early dismissal of article IV, section 2 as the source for the right to travel
interstate see Edwards v. California. 314 U.S. 160, 180 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(California statute prohibiting the importation of nonresident indigents held invalid as
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce). Justice Douglas, in his concurring
opinion, preferred to decide the case using the fundamental right to travel. He found
that article IV, section 2 could not protect interstate movement. Relying, among other
cases, on Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868), Ward v. Maryland, 79 US.
(12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871), and the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75
(1872), he recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause therein protected rights
of state citizenship "so that a citizen of one State is not in a 'condition of alienage when
he is within or when he removes to another State."' Id. (quoting Blae v. McClung, 172
U.S. 239, 256 (1898)). Instead, Justice Douglas found that, because the right to move
from state to state was a right of national citizenship, it had to be protected elsewhere in
the Constitution, specifically by the Privileges and Immunities clause in the Fourteenth
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view is that the right to travel does not come from this clause,71
as recently as 1982, Justice O'Connor was willing to remember
the roots of the right to travel in the Articles of Confederation
and federalist ideals. In a concurring opinion to Zobel v. Wil-
liams72 Justice O'Connor asserted that the source of the right to
travel is article IV, section 2. She traced the history of the right
of interstate travel from its beginnings through the early judicial
precedents and came to the conclusion that "application of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to controversies involving the
'right to travel' would at least begin the task of reuniting this
elusive right with the constitutional principles it embodies. '73
If history alone were the guideline, article IV would be the
clear choice for a source for the right to travel.74 And, while judi-
cial reconstruction of the Constitution has changed the nature of
the clause,75 such interpretive changes should not alter an analy-
sis of the original source of the right.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause,76 which is interpreted to guarantee the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship, 7 is another possible source
for the right to travel. In the Slaughter House Cases the Court
Amendment. Id. at 179, 181.
71 See Intrastate Residence, supra note 3, at 603-04 ("The modern view is that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause has no substantive content but merely forbids states
from discriminating against citizens of other states."); Antihomeless, supra note 3, at 607
("The current view holds that Article IV does not protect the right to travel because it
merely forbids states from discriminating in favor of their own citizens and has no sub-
stantive content of its own."); see also notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
72 457 U.S. 55, 79 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 81.
7" But see Edwards, 314 U.S. at 180-81 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding the source
for the right to travel in the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amend.
ment, rather than article IV, section 2). See also note 70 supra.
" See discussion of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948), and the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), in
notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra. These cases limited the scope of the clause by
holding that it protects, rather than creates, rights.
7' "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 Thd Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873) (The Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the privileges and immunities
of the citizens of the United States, not those of the citizens of a state.).
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indicated that the right of interstate travel was a privilege of
national citizenship.78 However, this clause has fallen into disuse
because the privileges of national citizenship have been defined
very narrowly. 9 The last attempt to link the right to travel to
the clause occurred in 1941.80 From a policy standpoint, the
Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to be the sole or original
source of the right to travel. Reliance on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would imply that from 1787, when the Constitution was
ratified, until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, United States citizens did not have the federal right to
travel freely from one state to another. That the states could
restrict citizens from other states from crossing their borders is
contrary to the concept of the Union created by the Constitution
and, therefore, unlikely.
3. The Due Process Clauses
Because the right to travel has often been deemed a funda-
mental personal liberty, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments8 2 have been suggested as sources
78 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1973). (Louisiana law granting monopoly to one corporation
held constitutional and not a violation of Fourteenth Amendments Privileges and Im-
munities Clause that was found to protect the rights to which people are entitled as
citizens of the United States and not rights to which people are entitled through their
state citizenship).
79 See Right to Travel, supra note 3, at 119 (referring to Privileges and Immunities
Clause in Fourteenth Amendment as "dead letter"); Antihomeless, supra note 3, at 607
(The strict limitation of national citizenship rights makes it "unlikely" that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause would include the right to travel
among them.); notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
8 See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 181 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The concurring Justices agreed with the opinion of the Court that Califor-
nia's statute prohibiting the importation of indigents to the state had violated the Con-
stitution; however, they felt that a right to travel analysis was more appropriate than a
Commerce Clause analysis. According to Justice Douglas, "when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was adopted in 1868, it had been squarely and authoritatively settled that the right
to move freely from State to State was a right of national citizenship. As such it was
protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against
state interference." Id. at 179 (emphasis in original).
Justice Jackson agreed: "This Court should ... hold squarely that it is a privilege
of citizenship of the United States, protected from state abridgement, to enter any state
of the Union .... If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing." Id. at
183.
a1 "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...." US. CONsT. amend. V.
'2 "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
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for the right of interstate travel.8 3 These clauses offer a stronger
analysis than other clauses because they have been held to have
substantive content."4 Still, the Fifth Amendment is not the
most likely original source for the right of interstate travel, be-
cause the Fifth Amendment has not been used outside the con-
text of international travel and is not a restriction on state
power.
Historically, the Fifth Amendment has been used to justify
the federal right of United States citizens to travel internation-
ally.88 Since the Fifth Amendment is a protection solely from
interference by the federal government, it is the logical source
for a right to international travel, because only the federal gov-
ernment may pose an obstacle to this right. Yet the Fifth
Amendment has also been cited as a possible source for the right
of interstate travel.86 This interpretation is strongest when the
right of interstate travel is characterized as the freedom of
movement and as a general aspect of personal liberty.
Practically speaking, the Fifth Amendment is not a strong
source for the right of interstate travel. The Fifth Amendment
only insures that citizens receive adequate process when the fed-
eral government is interfering with personal liberty. Since the
Fifth Amendment is not directed at the states, reliance on it for
the right of interstate travel indicates that the Framers left the
early citizens of the Union unprotected from interference by the
states. When dealing with interstate travel, interference by the
states is precisely the major concern.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is also a
possible source for the right of interstate travel. While there is a
process of law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'3 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (citing the Fifth Amendment as the
source for a right to international travel); Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1990) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause among other possible
sources for the right to travel interstate).
" See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding the right to marry a substantive
right created by the Due Process Clause).
81 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (The Court invalidated the Secretary
of State's regulation denying passports to communists because the "right to travel is a
part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment.").
86 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 669-71 (1969) (Harlan, J. dissenting)
("The last possible source of a right to travel is one which does operate against the Fed-
eral Government: the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
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history of affording the Due Process Clause substantive content,
the coverage of this clause has been severely restricted since the
Lochner Era's discredited cases.87 Recently, the Due Process
Clause has again been used as the source for certain fundamen-
tal rights, but only within very limited contexts."" However, the
Court's recent right to travel cases, without designating a source
for the right, use language reminiscent of substantive due pro-
cess ideals.
Shapiro v. Thompson"9 is the leading case of the modern
era dealing with the right to travel. As with most of these mod-
ern cases, the Court confronted durational residence require-
ments. Specifically, people had to reside within the jurisdiction
for at least one year in order to receive welfare benefits. 0e In
holding the statutes unconstitutional, the Court found that the
statutes burdened the constitutionally protected right of inter-
state travel, yet the Court explicitly declined to point to the
source of this right.91 However, the Court spoke of personal lib-
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), heralded the finding of certain substan.
tive, fundamental rights created by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, the Lochner doctrine was subsequently discredited. See Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Court then developed a new, more limited approach for
establishing substantive due process rights. The test for whether something was funda-
mental, as articulated by Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), became whether
the right was part of the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." While such lan-
guage may seem vague and subject to broad interpretation, the Supreme Court made it
clear in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that it was not going to read this
language broadly. In upholding a Georgia law making sodomy a crime, the Bowers Court
said that the Court "is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
and design of the Constitution." Id. at 194.
" Today, the cases that do find substantive due process rights have been primarily
limited to decisions about family matters or procreation. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting the right for the extended family to live to-
gether); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting the right of women to choose to
have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the right to
use contraceptives).
89 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The Court also faced durational residence requirements in Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). In
both of these cases the Court dealt with the problem by using a right to travel analysis.
See notes 125-32 and accompanying text infra. For a durational residence requirement
case where the Court distinguished Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County, see Sesna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (holding that durational residence requirement for a divorce
did not unconstitutionally discriminate against persons who exercised their right to
travel).
92 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 ("We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right
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erties9 2 and fundamental rights9 3 in a way that harkened back to
substantive due process precedents. Furthermore, Justice Stew-
art in his concurring opinion stated that the right to travel is an
"unconditional personal right. '9 4
Finding the source of the right to travel interstate in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause suffers from the
same defects as finding it in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Reliance on the Due Process Clause would mean that
the first citizens under the Constitution did not have a federally
protected right to travel interstate. Thus a state could have de-
nied access to United States citizens coming from out-of-state.
Given the Framers' federalist values, such a result is
unthinkable.
Overall, however, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause could provide a source for the right to travel today, even
if it was not the original source from the time of the drafting of
the Constitution. The Shapiro Court's depiction of the right of
interstate travel with language usually reserved for the recogni-
tion of substantive due process rights provides support for the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause is a source for the right to travel. This is buttressed, by
to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.").
92 "This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to
travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Id. at 629.
11 Id. at 630-31 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)):
The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has
been firmly established and repeatedly recognized . . . . [T]he right finds no
explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that
a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary con-
comitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic
right under the Constitution.
Id. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, by referring to the right to
travel as a personal right, used language usually reserved for substantive due process
arguments. Yet, he stated that the right to travel interstate is protected by some part of
the Constitution other than the Fourteenth Amendment because it is not subject to the
regulation and control that accompanies rights found there. Id. at 642-43. However, Jus-
tice Stewart then explained that only a compelling governmental interest can overcome
interference with the right of interstate travel, whether the Court used an equal protec-
tion or due process theory from the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments. Id. at 644. Thus,
Justice Stewart made only one thing clear: he was not certain what part of the Constitu-
tion creates this "unconditional personal right" to travel interstate.
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the Court's recent, albeit limited, trend of allowing fundamental
rights to emerge from this clause. Therefore, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment remains a viable source
for the right to travel interstate.
4. The Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause' 5 was
the source of the right to travel in the Court's first case to pre-
sent the issue.98 Since then, however, the theory has been used
sparingly, and not at all since its use in Edwards v. California1
in 1941. One objection to relying on this clause is that it equates
people with commerce. This objection was raised in Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in Edwards where he said, "[T]he
migrations of a human being... do not fit easily into my notions
as to what is commerce. To hold that the measure of [this right]
is the commerce clause is likely to result either in distorting
commercial law or denaturing human rights." 8
Another important problem with using the Commerce
Clause as a source of the right to travel is that the Commerce
Clause grants power to Congress. It begins, "Congress shall have
Power ... ." Specifically, the Commerce Clause acts as an indi-
rect restraint against the states.99 If a state burdens interstate
commerce, Congress can regulate against it.100 Thus, it makes
Is "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... "US. Co.sr. art I, § 8.
ISmith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (declaring
unconstitutional state statutes that imposed taxes on nonresidents when they arrived in
the ports of the state).
9 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The Court relied on the Commerce Clause as the source for a
right of interstate travel in striking down a California law which made it a misdemeanor
to bring a nonresident indigent into the state. Id. at 173.
98 Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948) (invalidating under the Com-
merce Clause a South Carolina statute requiring owners of shrimp boats fishing in the
state's waters to dock at ports in the state and stamp their catch with a tax stamp before
shipping or transporting it to another state). "(Tihe importance of having commerce
between the forty-eight States flow unimpeded by local barriers persuades us that State
restrictions inimical to the commerce clause should not be approved ... ." Id. at 406.
100 For example, Congress created the Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause
to prevent racial discrimination. The Act was upheld even though the impact on inter-
state commerce that Congress was regulating was arguably slight. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Civil Rights Act under the Com-




little sense to use this clause as the source of a right of the peo-
ple to be free from governmental interference. Because the Com-
merce Clause is a grant of power to the Congress, it cannot be a
grant of power to the people to travel freely. The problems sur-
rounding the use of this clause as a source for the right to travel
combined with the Court's abandonment of it as a source make
it an unlikely candidate for the source of the right to travel
interstate.
5. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 01 requires consideration as a possible source for the right
of interstate travel. Rather than referring to the clause as the
actual source for the right, the Supreme Court recognized that it
is more accurate to say that the right of interstate travel has
been entangled with equal protection analysis.10 2 From this per-
spective, the Equal Protection Clause is not seen as a source for
the right to travel.
The Court articulated this entanglement in Zobel v. Wil-
liams, where it treated the right to travel as a particular applica-
tion of equal protection analysis. 0 3 Applying an equal protection
analysis, the Court struck down Alaska's dividend distribution
plan because it used length of residence as a guideline and
thereby impinged on the fundamental right to travel.04 More
important, the Court noted that the use of an equal protection
analysis did not necessarily mean that the Equal Protection
Clause was the source of the right to travel. 05
101 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec.
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102 Rather than springing from the Equal Protection Clause, the right to travel
emerges in certain types of cases where people are being treated unequally, and the
Court thus employs an equal protection analysis. For example, the Court has dealt in
this way with residence requirements that make distinctions between newcomers and
longer term residents. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text infra.
os Zobel, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982).
10 Even the Court recognized that since the modem era of travel cases that began
with Shapiro, the Court has been using equal protection analyses to strike down dura.
tional residence requirements because they impinge on the fundamental right to travel.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972) ("In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the
compelling-state.interest test would be triggered by 'any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] . . . .'" (emphasis added by Dunn Court)).
'10 See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6 ("In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little
more than a particular application of equal protection analysis.").
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The Equal Protection Clause is another provision of the
Constitution that ordinarily does not confer substantive
rights.10 The clause is aimed only at preventing certain forms of
invidious discrimination. 107 Through judicial process, the clause
has come to mean that some classifications which are inherently
suspect 18 as well as classifications which trigger some free-
standing, important constitutional right, require heightened
scrutiny. 09 To the extent that the right to travel has been impli-
cated in recent equal protection cases, the Court's holdings have
not relied on the use of suspect classifications in order to
heighten the judicial scrutiny.110 Thus, the Court relies on the
fundamental quality of the right of interstate travel11 in requir-
ing heightened scrutiny when this right has been viQlated. 112
In order for the right to travel to be fundamental, it must
have emerged from somewhere else in the Constitution. 3 Thus,
10' See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates
no substantive liberties.").
110 Id. at 28 (Court refused to use heightened scrutiny to review school financing
despite appellees' allegation that the system discriminated against a suspect class).
1o8 Id. (To compel the use of strict scrutiny, the class suffering from discrimination
must have some of the "traditional indicia of suspectness.").
10 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ("Shapiro was subjected to strict
scrutiny under the compelling state interest test, not because it was based on any suspect
criterion such as race, nationality, or alienage, but because it impinged upon the funda-
mental right of interstate movement."); San Antonio, 41 U.S. at 1 (finding that educa-
tion is not a "fundamental right" which requires the application of the strict standard of
review).
110 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618, 627 (The Court applied strict scrutiny when it
required the states to advance compelling interests to justify the classification between
indigents residing in the state for a year or more and indigents residing in the state for
less than a year.). See also note 109 supra.
III Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (The right to travel inter-
state "occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.").
11I See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence
requirement for voter registration struck down under Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment as violating the right of interstate travel); Memorial Ho3p. v. Mari-
copa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (state law allowing hospital to refuse to aid indigents
who had not resided in the county for one year struck down under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it violated the right of interstate travel).
3 See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1990). The Lutz court
recognized that simply because right to travel cases have used an equal protection analy-
sis "is not to say that the right to travel itself necessarily arises under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause." Id. at 265. The court concluded that for the statute under consideration
before it to be "deemed constitutionally protected activity [under the Equal Protection




while equal protection analysis is used in right to travel cases,
there is no reason to believe that the Equal Protection Clause is
the source of the right to travel.
6. The "Sourceless" Approach
A final approach recognizes the existence of the right to
travel interstate without identifying a specific provision as its
source. Indeed it seems as if the Supreme Court has given up
trying to locate a single source. For example, in United States v.
Guest114 the Court said, "Although there have been recurring
differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the
constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to
canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right
exists. '115
Because there is such a long tradition of recognizing the
right of interstate travel,116 perhaps courts feel it must simply
exist. However, since there is no tradition recognizing a federal
right of intrastate travel, the "sourceless" approach does little or
nothing to help in the search for this intrastate travel right and
its origins.
B. The Existence of the Right of Intrastate Travel
Precedents for the right of intrastate travel, especially from
the Supreme Court, are scarce. 1 7 Therefore, courts must ex-
amine the holdings and dicta of interstate travel cases when
searching for the right of intrastate travel.11 8 Such an analysis is
114 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (This case presented a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988),
the criminal companion to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).). For a further discussion of
Guest, see notes 212-18 and accompanying text infra.
"I Guest, 383 U.S. at 759.
.. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) ("The right of
interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom.").
.. Early dicta for the existence of the right of intrastate travel can be found in
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 280 (1920), where the Court said:
In all the States from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inherent in
citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their
respective States, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free
ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the States
to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right.
Id. at 293.
"0 For intrastate travel cases that refer to Supreme Court interstate travel cases, see
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illuminating to the extent that it helps discount more sources
than it supports. Furthermore, it leads to the conclusion that in
order for an intrastate right to exist, it must be independent of
an interstate right.11
1. The Supreme Court's Durational Residence
Requirement Cases
The most recent line of Supreme Court cases dealing with
interstate travel involved durational residence requirements.120
These cases have been scrutinized by lower courts grappling
with the intrastate issue. In interpreting the Supreme Court
cases, the lower courts have split almost equally on whether
there is a right of intrastate travel.
1 21
In nearly all of the recent Supreme Court cases, the Court
has characterized the right to travel as the right to travel inter-
state. In the leading case, Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court
struck down statutes that required citizens to be state residents
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing Shapiro, Dunn, Mari-
copa County and Zobel); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (discussing Shapiro); Cole v. Housing Auth.
of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1970) (discussing Shapiro). See note 121 infra.
219 See notes 188-90 and accompanying text infra.
20 See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
12 See notes 142-71 and accompanying text infra. The First Circuit implicitly rec-
ognized the right of intrastate travel by striking down a residence requirement as applied
to people moving their residences within the state. Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport,
435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). The Second Circuit realized the impact of the First Circuit's
holding and explicitly recognized the right of intrastate travel in a factually similar case.
King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 863 (1971). Most recently, the Third Circuit, in a case outside the residence require-
ment context, established a right of intrastate travel Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255
(3d Cir. 1990) (The court considered the right to travel intrastate in its decision to up-
hold an anticruising ordinance.).
On the other hand, the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have refused to recognize
the right of intrastate travel. The Fifth Circuit explicitly found Shapiro and Dunn inap.
plicable as interstate travel cases. Wright v. City of Jackson, Missiippi, 506 F.2d 900,
902 (5th Cir. 1975). The Sixth Circuit said it could find no support in the constitution for
a right of intrastate travel Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir.
1976). The Seventh Circuit refused to consider the right of intrastate travel beyond the
context of a durational residence requirement. Since the court determined that the case
before it did not involve a durational residence requirement, the court did not have to
consider whether the right to travel intrastate existed. Andre v. Board of Trustees of
Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48, 53 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)
(The court distinguished the residence requirement in a village ordinance as a nondura-
tional and therefore "bona fide" residence requirement.).
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for at least one year before they could be eligible for welfare
benefits. 122 The Court found that the statutes impermissibly in-
hibited migration by needy persons "into the State.'' 1 2 3 Thus,
the Court found that a right of interstate travel existed and that
the statutes in question interfered with this right. The Court re-
lied on the concepts of federalism and personal liberty to sup-
port its recognition of this right. 124
In Dunn v. Blumstein the Court struck down a Tennessee
law that required residence in the state for one year and in the
county for three months as prerequisites for voter registration. 12
Because the Court found that the requirement penalized those
persons who had recently exercised their right to travel, the
Court used heightened scrutiny and struck down the law under
an equal protection analysis. 2 6 The Court noted that actual de-
terrence of travel need not be proven; instead the law must un-
dergo strict scrutiny if it "'operates to penalize those persons,
and only those persons, who have exercised their constitutional
right of interstate migration.' 11127 The Court did not address the
deterrent effect the law might have had on intrastate migration.
The right of intrastate travel was finally mentioned by the
Justices who decided Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,128
but the Court left undecided the possibility of a constitutional
distinction between interstate and intrastate travel.12 In Mari-
copa County the appellant had been denied medical care be-
cause he had not resided for one year in the county, as was re-
quired by Arizona law. 30 The Court was able to strike down the
statute without construing it to apply only to intrastate mi-
grants by reading it to include people who moved to the county
12 Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).
123 Id. at 629.
124 "This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to
travel throughout the length and breadth of our land . "Id.
"I' Dunn, 405 U.S. 330, 331 (1972).
126 Id. at 338.
227 Id. at 341 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (Brennan, White
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
128 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
129 "Even were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intra-
state travel, a question we do not now consider, such a distinction would not support thejudgment of the Arizona court in the case before us." Id. at 255-56.
1.. Id. at 251-52.
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from out-of-state. Here the Court seemed to be following the
lead of the Arizona Supreme Court.13' However, the Court did
address this argument in a footnote and found it "inconsistent
to argue that the residence requirement should be construed to
bar longtime Arizona residents, even if unconstitutional as ap-
plied to persons migrating into Maricopa County from outside
the State."'132
More recently, in Zobel v. Williams,133 the Court struck
down an Alaska benefits distribution plan as violating the Equal
Protection Clause. Alaska had established a benefits fund from a
portion of its mineral income.3 The plan distributed income
from the fund unequally, giving a higher percentage to people
who had lived in Alaska longer. 3  The Court found that under-
lying this scheme was the notion that some citizens would be
"more equal than others" and thus the statute impermissibly
discriminated. 38 The majority opinion did not reach its conclu-
sion on the basis of the right of interstate travel. Rather, the
Court found the right to travel issue was subsumed into an equal
protection analysis.3 7 The Court recognized the existence of the
right and noted that its source remained obscure but found that
the case before it was distinguishable from previous right to
travel cases.138 Since Alaska's scheme distinguished between res-
idents based on when they arrived in the state, it treated some
state citizens differently than others and therefore was subject
231 Id. at 256.
1 Id. at 256 n.9.
The Court seemed to suggest that it makes no sense to allow people who came from
out-of-state to escape the residence requirements, considering that people who had al-
ways resided in the state, but had just recently moved into the county, received no bene-
fit from their allegiance to the state simply because they had not traveled interstate. Id.
Other courts have recognized that the right of intrastate travel would eliminate the ap-
parent injustice of this inconsistency. The Second Circuit, in King v. New Rochelle Mun.
Hous. Auth., chose to remedy the inconsistency by recognizing the right to travel intra-
state. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971). See also notes 148-
52 and accompanying text infra.
125 457 U.S. 55 (1982).'
124 Id.
15 Id. at 56.
116 Id. at 71.
187 "In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular applica-
tion of equal protection analysis. Right to travel cases have examined, in equal protec-





to equal protection analysis.139
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, however, did recog-
nize that the right to travel interstate was implicated by the dis-
tribution plan. Her reading of the precedents revealed that the
Court struck down statutes that rewarded long-term state citi-
zens, not because such rewards would be impermissible under
the Equal Protection Clause, but only because "[their] imple-
mentation would abridge an interest in interstate travel or mi-
gration." '140 Justice O'Connor then conducted her own analysis,
which would have struck down the law as an infringement of the
right to travel which she found to be guaranteed by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause in article IV.14 1 Since she derived
the right to travel from the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
she applied the test used for privileges and immunities cases.
She found that the law must be struck down because it denied
people who came from outside the state the same privileges as
others in the state.142
While the holdings in these cases do not provide much guid-
ance for finding an intrastate right to travel, the language used
in these cases and in earlier precedents does provide by analogy
possible sources for the right of intrastate travel. The provisions
of the Constitution discussed as sources for the right of inter-
state travel are not surprisingly the same ones that have been
used by the lower courts that have dealt with the intrastate
travel issue.
2. Sources of the Right of Intrastate Travel
The following examination of federal courts of appeals cases
addressing the right of intrastate travel will show how courts
have dealt with recent and older interstate travel cases in an at-
tempt to establish the source and existence of an intrastate
right. Although there is no consensus about the constitutional
source of the right of interstate travel, there is unanimous agree-
ment that the right actually exists. When discussing intrastate
travel, one must bear in mind that there is no consensus as to
whether there even is such a federally protected right, let alone
139 Id.
:40 Id. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




from which constitutional provision it emerges. The following
analysis will lead to the conclusion that the right of intrastate
travel does exist, and its source is the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
The first case to actually establish a right of intrastate
travel was the 1970 First Circuit case Cole v. Housing Authority
of Newport.14 This case presented a city durational residence
requirement for admission to public housing.1" The Cole court
found that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and
thus struck it down as applied to both new residents who had
moved within the state and those who had moved from out-of-
state.14 5 The court did not explicitly articulate a right of intra-
state travel, and therefore it did not point to a particular source
for the right. However; in striking down the statute as applied to
the newcomers to the city who moved from within the state, it
could be argued that the court was implicitly recognizing a right
of intrastate travel without delving into any of the legal issues
that such a formal finding would involve.146 This implicit finding
in Cole did not go unnoticed when the Second Circuit dealt with
a factually indistinguishable case. In King v. New Rochelle Mu-
nicipal Housing Authority1 47 the Second Circuit cited Cole in
order to invalidate under equal protection analysis a resolution
requiring people to live in New Rochelle for five years before
becoming eligible for public housing, because the resolution im-
pinged on the right to travel..4 The Second Circuit adopted the
Cole court's analysis and, even though it claimed to only present
a general description of its reasoning, choosing to rely on Cole
for the fine points, the King court dealt more thoroughly with
the issue. 41The Second Circuit in King undertook a brief analysis of
243 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
14" Id. at 808. The regulations of the Newport Housing Authority, § 11(A)(4)(e), re-
quired that applicants for public housing reside in Newport for at least two years. Cole v.
Housing Auth. of Newport, 312 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.I.L 1970).
141 Cole, 453 F.2d at 813.
148 See Intrastate Residence, supra note 3, at 608-09 (discussing Cole as upholding
a right of intrastate travel).
247 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
148 Id. at 648.
149 Id. ("Although we reach our result independently of the First Circuit, we adopt
that court's reasoning on the finer points involved and present in this opinion only the
broad fabric of our approach.").
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Shapiro, the Supreme Court's leading durational residence re-
quirement case. The King court noted that in Shapiro, the Su-
preme Court had specifically refused to try to find a source for
the right to travel and had instead relied on the importance of
the right to the constitutional concept of personal liberty.10
Thus, the Second Circuit was satisfied that the right to travel
existed. 151 From that point the court was able to leap to the exis-
tence of an intrastate right within this general, all-encompassing
right to travel with one sentence: "It would be meaningless to
describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental pre-
cept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative
constitutional right to travel within a state.' ' 152 Even though the
court did not find a source for the right, with this statement the
right of intrastate travel obtained its first official recognition.
After King the right of intrastate travel did not gain imme-
diate acceptance. In fact, other circuits avoided the intrastate
issue or found that the right did not exist. For example, the
Fifth Circuit in Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississipp'0 3 gave
little consideration to the possibility of a right of intrastate
travel when it upheld a city ordinance requiring city employees
to live within the city. The plaintiffs were a class of nonresident
firemen who challenged the ordinance as, among other things, a
violation of their right to travel. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the
"Shapiro-Dunn"'54 line of reasoning and found that since it
dealt exclusively with interstate travel it was inapplicable to
Wright, because Wright dealt with a continual residency re-
150 Id.
. The King court looked to Shapiro for guidance and found the case applicable
even though it only dealt with interstate travel. The King court found the Supreme
Court's exclusive use of the word "interstate" in its analysis to be a reflection of the facts
of that case. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's refusal to find a
specific source for the right supported its view that Shapiro could be applied beyond the
interstate travel context. Id. Especially since the Shapiro Court rested its holdin' on
"constitutional concepts of personal liberty," the Second Circuit could and did find that
the right of intrastate travel arose from the same notions of liberty. Id. (quoting Shapiro,
394 U.S. at 629).
152 Id.
153 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
15 Id. at 902. In 1972 the Supreme Court decided Dunn v. Blumstein in which it
elaborated upon its view on the right to travel interstate. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Shapiro
and Dunn were the Supreme Court's only cases discussing the right to travel interstate
in 1975 when the Fifth Circuit decided Wright.
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quirement and therefore implicated intrastate travel.15 The
plaintiffs argued that there was no logical distinction between
interstate and intrastate travel.156 The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
saying "that such application would substantially distort the
principles of Shapiro and Dunn, and the reasons for those
decisions."' 57
The Wright court explained its reasoning by noting that
Shapiro invalidated only the durational requirement. The resi-
dency requirement was not likewise unconstitutional. The pre-
requisite that welfare recipients reside for one year in the state
penalized those people who had recently exercised their right to
travel. Requiring those people to be state residents, regardless of
how long, in order to reap benefits from the state, was a distinct
and valid way to reward people within the state.5
In Wardwell v. Board of Education of City School District
the Sixth Circuit expressly found no support for a constitution-
15 Wright, 506 F.2d at 902. A continual residency requirement mandates only resi-
dency in a certain place for entitlement to benefits. A durational residency requirement
uses length of residency to determine who is entitled to benefits.
A durational residency requirement therefore treats citizens of a state differently
based on how long they have resided in the state or somewhere within the state. This
classification penalizes people who have recently traveled and therefore can deter both
interstate and intrastate travel, because it creates a waiting period before a traveler can
qualify for benefits. However, only the interference with the interstate travel right has
caused the Supreme Court to raise the level of scrutiny and invalidate such require-
ments. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
A continual residency requirement, such as the one in Wright, does not classify state
citizens differently depending on whether they have recently traveled interstate. Some-
one who moves to the city from out-of-state is treated the same as someone who moves
to the city from within the state. Therefore the ordinance in Wright did not penalize
people for exercising their right of interstate travel However, the ordinance did impli-
cate the right of intrastate travel because it required employees to be citizens of a partic-
ular city within the state.
125 Id.
26 Id.
I d. The Wright court also explained how the Supreme Court in Dunn reaffirmed
the position it took in Shapiro. See id. In Dunn the Court struck down the durational
portion of a residency requirement for voting but found that nothing in its holding was
"meant to cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied
bona fide residence requirements." Dunn, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n.13.
In other words, durational residence requirements violate the Equal Protection
Clause because they result in the different treatment of citizens of the same state
through their impact on the right to travel interstate. On the other hand, general resi-
dence requirements, which merely require that people be citizens of the state, do not
treat citizens of the same state differently.
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ally protected right of intrastate travel.159 In Wardwell the court
upheld the board of education's rule that required all newly
hired teachers in Cincinnati schools to establish residency in the
city school district within ninety days of employment.160 The
plaintiff in that case lived in Ohio but outside the school district
and failed to move as required by the rule.'' The Sixth Circuit's
reading of Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa County6 2 convinced
the court that the only fundamental right recognized by those
cases was the right of interstate travel. 63 The Wardwell court
found that the rule in question imposed only a continuing or
"bona fide" residence requirement which did not burden the
right to travel because travel meant more than just movement.6 4
Finding no fundamental interest at stake, the court used the
minimum scrutiny analysis which requires only that the state
have a rational basis for the rule.6" The Sixth Circuit found that
the rule passed the much easier test.66
'59 Wardwell, 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976) ("We find no support for plaintiff's
theory that the right to intrastate travel has been afforded federal constitutional
protection.").
100 Id. at 629.
101 Id at 626.
162 Id. at 627. Maricopa County was the most recent word on the right to travel in
the durational residence requirements context at the time when the Sixth Circuit was
considering Wardwell. See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Thus the Wardwell
Court added Maricopa County to the Shapiro-Dunn case line and discussed this new
case at length. Like the Fifth Circuit in Wright , see note 158 supra, the Sixth Circuit
found that the Supreme Court cases applied to durational and not bona fide continuing
residence requirements. Wardwell, 529 F.2d at 627.
103 Id. The Wardwell court stated that its "conclusion [was] that Shapiro and the
other right to travel cases are not applicable to intrastate travel and continuing em-
ployee residency requirements . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original). This language could
mean that the court did not believe there is a right of intrastate travel. However, the
Wardwell court did not explicitly find that the right of intrastate travel does not exist.
In fact the court said, "where, as in the present case, a continuing residency requirement
affecting at most the right of intrastate travel is involved, the 'rational basis' test is the
touchstone to determine its validity." Id. at 628 (emphasis in orignial). This language
implies that the right does exist. The court seemed to rest its decision on the type of
residency requirement (continuing as opposed to durational), rather than on its impact
on the right to travel.
I" Id. at 627. "Later, in invalidating a durational residence requirement for voter
registration on the basis of Shapiro, [the Supreme Court] cautioned that [its] decision
was not intended to 'cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly
applied bona fide residence requirements."' Id. (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 342 n.13 (1972)).




The Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to consider an in-
trastate travel claim in Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of
Maywood..6 7 Andre involved a challenge to an ordinance that re-
quired all department heads and administrative personnel to es-
tablish residency in Maywood within two years; it required all
other employees to establish Maywood residency within four
years."8 " The plaintiffs, municipal employees, challenged the
residency requirement as a violation of equal protection and
urged the application of the strict scrutiny test because the ordi-
nance infringed on their fundamental right to travel interstate
and intrastate.169 The court, relying on Dunn, held that the ordi-
nance did not violate the right of interstate travel, because the
residence requirement was continuing or "bona fide" and not
durational. 17 0 As for the plaintiffs' intrastate claim, the court
said that "[t]he claimed right of intrastate travel has been re-
jected by several courts."171
The Seventh Circuit did at least admit the King court's rec-
ognition of the right17 2 but found the King decision limited to
durational residence requirements. 17 1 The Andre opinion sug-
gested that the right found in King could be limited to the regu-
latory context in which it arose.1  Even though the Andre court
167 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
16 Id. at 49.
169 Id. at 52. Under a strict scrutiny test, legislation will be upheld only if it is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest. Id.
170 Id. The ordinance did not impose a durational requirement because it did not
require plaintiffs to live in the village for a specific period of time before qualifying for
some benefit. Plaintiffs were eligible to work for the village so long as they continued to
live there. Id. at 49.
171 Id. at 53 (citing Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1975) (holding that Shapiro and Dunn apply only to interstate travel); Abraham v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974) (upholding continuing residence re-
quirement as a condition of employment by the city); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.
3d 129, 514 P.2d 433 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974) (charter provision requir-
ing residence of municipal employees within city limits is not unconsitutional)).
172 Id. (noting that King and other cases "recognizing a fundamental right of intra-
state travel have done so vis-a-vis durational residence requirements").
173 Id.
17, The Second Circuit in King recognized the right of intrastate travel in order to
avoid the inconsistency that would arise if the residence requirement had been held un-
constitutional as applied to interstate migrants but upheld as applied to people moving
within the state. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 n.6 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971). The Andre Court, by distinguishing King as a
durational residence requirement case, implied that King's holding with respect to the
intrastate travel component was peculiar to the facts of the case and was not general
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was in no way bound by the King decision, the Andre court
could dismiss King's recognition of the right of intrastate travel
as a result peculiar to the facts of that case and the Second Cir-
cuit's inability to separate the intrastate from the interstate im-
pact of the residence requirement. 175
Most recently, the Third Circuit, in Lutz v. City of York,
expressly recognized the right of intrastate travel."7 ' In that case
the plaintiffs challenged an "anti-cruising" ordinance prohibit-
ing unnecessary repeated driving over public roads.17 7 The court
declined to use strict scrutiny and upheld the ordinance even
though it found the ordinance burdened the fundamental right
to travel intrastate. 178
The Lutz court, unlike the Second Circuit in Spencer, felt
obligated to point to a source for the right of intrastate travel to
justify recognizing that right. The Third Circuit's analysis in-
cluded a discussion of Shapiro and its progeny. 17 9 It also cited
King as authority for the right of intrastate travel.180 The court
was not satisfied that by tracing these modern cases it could le-
gitimately proclaim the existence of this nascent right.'81 Indeed
when the court cited King it expressed its dissatisfaction with
King's precedential value. The court said, "Although we ulti-
mately agree with the Second Circuit's result, we find its reason-
ing somewhat underarticulated, especially in light of the travel
authority for the existence of the right to travel intrastate. See Intrastate Residence,
supra note 3, at 609.
11 See Intrastate Residence, supra note 3, at 609 n.106.
However, the King decision was resurrected by the Spencer court when it held that
the right to travel intrastate exists and can be asserted as the underlying federal right in
a civil rights claim. 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990).
17 Lutz, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit's reasoning is highly rele-
vant to a search for the source of a right of intrastate travel since the court conducted an
extensive analysis of its own.
177 Id. at 256-57.
178 Id. at 269-70.
179 Id. at 258-59. As cited in Lutz, Shapiro's progeny includes: Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972) (which struck down durational residence requirement for voter qual-
ification using equal protection analysis and the right to travel interstate); Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 414 U.S. 250 (1974) (which held unconstitutional a durational
residence requirement for medical care eligibility without considering intrastate impact
of the law); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Court used a mix of right to travel and
equal protection analysis to invalidate a benefit distribution plan that used length of
residence in the state to determine amount of benefits).
180 Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261.
181 Id. at 259.
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cases decided since King.11 2 The Third Circuit then embarked
on the course of identifying and evaluating all the possible
sources for a right of intrastate travel. The court eliminated all
the possibilities except the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause.183 The court then concluded that the Due Process
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is the source of the right
of intrastate travel.
In its consideration of Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process, the Third Circuit relied on an older line of cases
28 Id. at 261. Apparently the Third Circuit was not only concerned that King had
never fully explained how and where it found the right of intrastate travel but it was also
concerned that cases like Wright, Wardwell and Andre had explicitly chosen not to find
a right of intrastate travel. See notes 153-75 and accompanying text supra.
18 The Lutz court clearly articulated its reasoning when it eliminated posible
sources for the right of intrastate travel. First, the court concluded that the article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause could be the source of the right of interstate but not
intrastate travel because the clause protects discrimination on the basis of state citizen-
ship. 899 F.2d at 262; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (which struck down
a state statute that discriminated against nonresidents as violating article IV, section 2);
notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra. Since the ordinance in Lutz treated everyone
driving on the local roads equally, regardless of their state citizenship, the ordinance
could only be a restriction on intrastate travel and therefore did not implicate article IV,
section 2. 899 F.2d at 262.
The court then eliminated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the clause had fallen into disuse and because the clause protects,
rather than creates, certain rights of national citizenship. Id. at 263-64; see also The
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 79 (1873) (The only rights protected by
this clause are those "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its national
character, its Constitution, or its laws."); notes 77-80 and accompanying text supra. The
court also determined that insofar as the right to travel interstate has been designated a
right of national citizenship, it only applies in the context of travel necessary for the
transaction of business with the national government. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 264 (citing Cran-
dall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (which struck down a tax imposed on all
persons leaving the state by railroad because it inhibited citizens from going to the seat
of the national government)). According to the court, any extension of this right to travel
to transact business with the national government into a general right to free movement
has been discredited, making it unlikely that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the source of the intrastate right. Id. at 264-65 (citing United
States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920) (Members of a conspiracy who forcibly removed
persons from their state of residence to another state and threatened them with bodily
harm should they ever return could not be criminally punished under federal law free-
dom of movement is within the authority of the states to enforce.)).
Next, the court found the Commerce Clause was not the source for the right of
intrastate travel by relying on its disuse as a source and by explaining that under com-
merce theory the ordinance would be upheld. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 265. The Equal Protec-
tion Clause also could not be the source for the right, according to the court, because the




containing useful dicta suggesting that there was a right to move
about freely that is part of personal liberty. 84 The court recog-
nized, however, that these early cases had subsequently been
questioned because of their link to the Lochner Era cases, and
that although today the Supreme Court does find new funda-
mental rights in the Due Process Clause, it has become increas-
ingly hesitant to do so.'85 In the end, the Third Circuit decided
that the Supreme Court's hesitation was not a good enough rea-
son to preclude the use of the Due Process Clause, and the court
determined that the clause applied because "the right to move
freely about one's neighborhood or town, even by automobile, is
indeed 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and 'deeply
rooted in the Nation's history.' "186 Thus, the Third Circuit de-
clared that a right of intrastate travel exists and that the only
possible source for that right is the substantive due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."8 7
By process of elimination and reliance on the importance of
the right of intrastate travel to the concept of personal libety,
the Lutz analysis demonstrated the source of the right of intra-
state travel is the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
This clause has a major advantage over the other possible
sources because it creates substantive rights.
Moreover, because the right of intrastate travel is so funda-
mental that it is hard to conceive of it not being protected by
the Constitution, the argument that it can be found within sub-
stantive due process is appealing. Substantive due process pro-
tects rights that flow naturally from a concept of liberty, and the
right to travel has often been characterized as a freedom of
184 Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266 (citing Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900) (holding
constitutional a Georgia revenue act that levied a tax on persons hiring laborers to work
outside the state)). While the Lutz court referred to a "line of cases," the court only
mentioned Williams. Id. The Third Circuit justified the exclusion of the other cases by
saying that Williams was the clearest. Id.
185 Id. at 267 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Supreme Court up-
held Georgia sodomy law and refused to find that any fundamental rights were violated
by the law)).
186 Id. at 268 (citations omitted). The court was uncertain that its judgment was
foolproof, but since the Supreme Court had not repudiated substantive due process and
had not answered the question it left open in Maricopa County, the Third Circuit
thought that there was room for argument. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974) (the Court decided not to consider whether there is a distinction between
the rights of interstate and intrastate travel).
18 Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268.
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movement necessary for the enjoyment of liberty. ss The right to
travel intrastate is an important part of the freedom of move-
ment which is an important aspect of personal liberty. The free-
dom of movement would be meaningless without the right to be
free from governmental intrusion when traveling from one place
to another within a state.
Even though the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be the
original source of the right to travel because it post-dates the
Constitution, it can still be the source for the right of intrastate
travel. The rights of interstate and intrastate travel need not
come from the same constitutional source. Although article IV
seems to be the source of the right of interstate travel,8 9 a right
of intrastate travel may well have a source independent of the
article IV source for interstate travel, especially considering that
the Framers were motivated by federalist concerns.8 ° The
Framers appear to have been more worried that each state
would restrict the movement by citizens over its borders. Only
after the Union was stable did people have to worry about other
freedoms that had to be insured within the states. These free-
doms are embodied by substantive due process, and the right of
intrastate travel is among them. 9'
I" See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (The Court referred to "the
constitutional right to a freedom of movement" potentially implicated by an antiloitering
statute.); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values."); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920) (The right to
move at will within one's state is a right inherent in citizens of all free governments.);
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) ("Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the
right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of
personal liberty .... ).
189 According to this Comment, article IV, section 2 is most likely the original source
of the right of interstate travel See notes 53-74 and accompanying text supra.
,90 See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261; Intrastate Residence, supra note 3, at 608 ("There is
also no reason why an independent intrastate right, in the nature of a personal freedom
supported by the due process... clause[s], could not exist simultaneously with an inter-
state right implied by the Constitution as a whole.").
,' See note 183 supra. The Supreme Court has not abolished Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process; it has only indicated that not everything will be so funda-
mental that it is protected by that provision. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). Bowers can easily be distinguished from the right to travel intrastate. The peti-
tioners in Bowers believed that a Georgia law making sodomy a crime was an unconstitu-
tional violation of privacy. Id. In refusing to invalidate the Georgia law, it can be argued
that the Court was refusing to stretch the concept of privacy any further. The right of
intrastate travel does not rest on notions of privacy. Therefore, the Court's hesitation in




C. Section 1985(3) and Its Application to Spencer
The Second Circuit found the Spencers' claim actionable
under title 42, section 1985(3) of the United States Code. The
claimed deprivation of Spencer's right to travel intrastate was
asserted as the fundamental right which was deprived by the
conspiracy that violated the statute. This final section of the
analysis focuses on how the infringement of this right must com-
port with the application of the statute as it has come to be in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit failed to
perform this analysis adequately; the analysis is far more com-
plicated than the court seemed willing to admit. The Second
Circuit incorrectly held that the plaintiffs' claim was actionable
because the court did not find that state action was a necessary
component of plaintiffs' claim under section 1985(3).
1. History of Section 1985(3)
The history of section 1985(3) is important for an under-
standing of Spencer for two reasons. First, the motivation of the
drafters of the statute illuminates whether they were trying to
combat the type of racial conflict presented by the Spencer case.
Second, the members of the Congress which enacted the statute
expressed reservations about their power to enact it and also ex-
pressed fears that the statute would be so all-encompassing that
it would become a general tort law.192 Both of these fears have
affected the way the statute has been interpreted by the
judiciary.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 contained the precursor to to-
day's section 1985(3). s3 The Act was the product of a Recon-
192 Representative (later President) James Garfield argued:
[T]he section needed to be tempered by a limiting provision. Not every run-of-
the-mill conspiracy should be swept under federal law; the bill should be lim-
ited to private conspiracies aimed at particular classes of citizens; its applica-
tion should be limited to conspiracies that sought to strip from certain classes
of individuals the equal protection of the laws. If the bill were revised to reach
only invidious conspiracies of the sort entered into by the Ku Klux Klan -
rather than every pact between two people to murder, rob, assault, commit
perjury, and so forth - then Garfield would lend his full support to the bill.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1871).
193 See McDonald, Starting from Scratch: A Revisionist View of 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) and Class-Based Animus, 19 CONN. L. REV. 471 (1987) ("[T]here is probably no
other federal statute in such complete disarray, distortion, and confusion as that section
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).").
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struction Congress attempting to deal with the new racial
problems left behind by the Civil War and the emancipation of
the slaves. 9 Also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, the Act was
specifically designed to combat the acts of violence for which the
newly formed Klan had already become notorious.' 5
When the House of Representatives first proposed the Civil
Rights Act it contained several sections, the second of which
eventually became the modern conspiracy statute, section
1985(3)." 8 Initially, section 2 of the Act provided criminal pun-
ishment to private individuals who conspired to deprive others
of their constitutional rights.197 The original second section was
questioned by a sizable opposition which believed it was beyond
the scope of congressional law-making power.198 Those opposed
to section 2 also voiced concern that "every backyard conspiracy
between two individuals would be a violation of federal law. 1" 9
I" See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 192, at 155.
195 Id. at 443. See also Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Mod-
ern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 Tx L Rav. 527, 533 (1985) (relating history
of § 1985(3)).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Historical Note (1988) (Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §2, 17
Stat. 13).
197 The text of section 2 provided that:
[I]f two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band, conspire, or
combine together to do any act in violation of the rights privileges, or immuni-
ties of any person, to which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, which, committed within a place under the sole and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States, would under any law of the United
States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, may-
hem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation or perjury, criminal
obstruction of legal process, or resistance of officers in discharge of official
duty, arson, or larceny, and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy or
combination shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to or
engaged in said conspiracy or combination, whether principals or accesories,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be liable
to a penalty of not exceeding $10,000, or to imprisonment not exceeding ten
years, or both, at the discretion of the court; provided, that if any party or
parties to such conspiracy or combination shall, in furtherance of such common
design, commit the crime of murder, such party or parties so guilty shall, upon
conviction thereof, suffer death; and provided also, that any offense punishable
under this act, begun in one judicial district of the United States and com-
pleted in another, may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and pun-
ished in either district.
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 192, at 317.
Id. at 412-15. See also McDonald, supra note 193, at 481 (The opposition was
concerned that section 2 invaded the states' jurisdiction over criminal acts.).
19 Gormley, supra, note 195, at 537. Representative (later President) Garfield made
a famous speech during the debates in which he said:
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Section 2 was subsequently amended to remedy the problems
suggested by those who opposed it. The amendment eliminated
the list of crimes and restricted the reach of civil conspiracies to
those that deprived "any person or class of persons of equal pro-
tection and equal privileges and immunities under the laws. ' 200
This amended version was enacted by Congress. Later, section 2
was recodified into three separate statutes, one of which is the
modern civil conspiracy statute embodied in section 1985(3).201
2. Early Judicial Interpretation
What is today codified as section 1985(3) received little ju-
dicial attention after its enactment in 1871. The post-Civil War
Court was quick to indicate its unwillingness to allow Congress
to guard civil rights at the federal level.20 2 In 1882 the Court
struck down one of the criminal provisions of the "Ku Klux
Klan Act" as unconstitutional, holding that Congress lacked the
authority to enact it under either the Thirteenth or the Four-
teenth Amendments.0 After this decision, the belief that the
same analysis would invalidate the civil conspiracy statute
[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the States are unequal, but that
even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic mal-
administration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a
portion of the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such
a state of facts is clearly made out, I believe the last clause of the first section
[of the bill] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to
those persons who are thus denied equal protection ....
Id. at 538 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 192, at app. 153).
200 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 192, at 478.
210 The other two recodified statutes were criminal provisions. One was found un-
constitutional in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). The other still exists today
at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988).
202 See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873) (limiting the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause to a small sub.
set of rights arising from national citizenship). See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883); Gormley, supra note 195, at 543 (When the Supreme Court limited the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter House Cases, it
also "removed much of the lifeblood from the Civil Rights Acts as well," since they "were
cast in language that parallelled the privileges and immunities clause .... ").
203 See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1882). The Harris Court noted
that parts of the Act, if separable, would be constitutional under the Thirteenth Amend.
ment. Id. at 640-41. This dicta lent further support to the Court's reasoning in Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971), that § 1985(3) was a valid exercise of congres-




caused the statute to lapse into a long period of disuse.204
The Supreme Court did not consider the civil conspiracy
statute until 1951 in Collins v. Hardyman,05 a case that was to
be overruled by Griffin v. Breckenridge20 1 twenty years later.
The plaintiffs in Collins were members of a political group plan-
ning to oppose the Marshall Plan.0 7 They claimed that the de-
fendants broke up their meeting through threats and a show of
force. The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants had
conspired within the meaning of the statute to deprive them of
the privileges and immunities and equal protection of the laws
of the United States and of their right to peaceably assemble to
discuss political issues.2 °8
The Supreme Court dusted off the civil conspiracy statute
long enough to hold that plaintiffs failed to make out a cause of
action under it, because they did not assert state action in their
claim.209 Emphasizing that the Act requires a conspiracy for the
purpose of depriving one of the equal protection of the laws or
equal privileges and immunities under the laws, the Court found
that "private discrimination is not inequality before the law un-
less there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give
sanction or sanctuary for doing so. ''21O According to the Court,
the purpose of the Act was to make the former slaves equal
under the eyes of the law to other citizens and no more.2 11 Even
though Collins stands for the proposition that state action is a
required element of a claim under, section 1985(3), thereby nar-
204 Shatz, The Second Death of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of
History in Statutory Interpretation, 27 B.C.L. Rlv. 911, 916 (1986) (The Harris decision
"not only invalidated the criminal conspiracy portion of the statute, but appeared, by
like reasoning, to doom Section 1985(3) as well.").
205 341 U.S. 651 (1951) (The civil conspiracy statute was at that time codified as 8
U.S.C. § 47(3).).
-- 403 U.S. 88 (1971). For a discussion of Griffin, see notes 219-39 and accompany-
ing text infra.
20- Collins, 341 U.S. at 653.
208 Id. at 654.
209 Id. at 655.
210 Id. at 660-61.
211 Id. at 661. By referring to the right as one of equal treatment under the law, the
concept of state action became entwined with the notion of equal treatment. Without
state action, "the law" was not involved. Without involving the law, plaintiffs could not
make out a claim under the statute. Thus, if plaintiffs alleged unequal treatment merely
by private citizens, they did not allege unequal treatment under the law and did not
have a valid cause of action.
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rowing the possible uses of the statute, the case breathed new
life into the statute as a mechanism for protecting civil rights at
the federal level simply by dispelling the fear, instilled by Harris
and the statute's subsequent obscurity, that the statute was
unconstitutional.
In 1966, the Supreme Court in United States v. Guest212
reaffirmed the necessity of state action for a valid claim under
the Civil Rights Act. In this case the Court examined 18 U.S.C.
section 241,213 the surviving criminal component of the Civil
Rights Act. The defendants were indicted for conspiracy to
threaten, intimidate and oppress black citizens in order to pre-
vent those citizens from enjoying public accommodation.2 14 Be-
cause the indictment alleged that the complainants were de-
prived of "the equal utilization, without discrimination upon the
basis of race, of public facilities, ' 1 15 it embraced rights protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.216
Furthermore, since the Court found section 241 to be remedial,
and therefore not conferring any separate substantive rights of
its own, the Court held that section 241 only protected rights
already secured by the Equal Protection Clause.21 1 Finding it a
"commonplace" that rights under this clause arise only when the
state is involved, the Court concluded that section 241 can be
invoked only with a showing of state action.1
212 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
213 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964) provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
so exercised the same ....
.... They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.
21' Guest, 383 U.S. at 748 n.1. According to the indictment, the defendants had
planned to prevent the plaintiffs and other black persons from using public streets and
facilities by shooting, beating or killing them and by damaging their property, making
threatening phone calls, going in disguise on highways and other places, making false
accusations leading to the arrests of black persons, and by burning crosses. Id.
225 Id.
210 Id. at 753.
217 Id. at 754-55.
218 Id. at 756. The Court did not determine the level of state action necessary be.
cause the facts of the case supported enough state involvement to prevent dismissal. Id.
For example, the arrest of plaintiffs by means of false accusations fulfills the require.
ment of state involvement, because it involves the police in the conspiracy. Furthermore,
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3. Modern Interpretation of Section 1985(3): Griffin to the
Present
In 1971 the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge219 resurrected section 1985(3) by holding that private con-
spiracies are actionable without a showing of any state involve-
ment. The Court reached this conclusion even though it
recognized that the language of the statute closely resembles the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment.220 The Court also rec-
ognized that the long history of Fourteenth Amendment cases,
which focuses on the search for the requisite state action, "has
. . . made it. . . difficult to conceive of what might constitute a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private per-
sons." '221 Still the Court said that "nothing inherent in the
phrase... requires the action working the deprivation [of equal
protection of the laws] to come from the State.' -2 22 Furthermore,
the Court believed that the legislative history demanded that
the statute cover private conspiracies.223 The facts that gave rise
to Griffin lent further support to the Court's decision, because
they seemed similar to the kind of Klan activity the drafters of
the Act sought to punish.224 The plaintiffs, three black men,
were traveling by car when the defendants, a group of white
men, drove their truck into the car's path, preventing it from
the Court said that the allegation implied that agents of the state participated in the
making of the false reports. Id.
The Court in Guest separately considered the charge that the defendants had crimi-
nally interfered with the complainants' right to travel Id. at 757-60. First, the Court
recognized the existence of the right of interstate travel, mentioning several sources for it
but declining to choose one. Id. The Court then found that, since the right does exist
under the Constitution, it was actionable under § 241. Id. at 760. However, since this
charge did not allege a violation of the right to equal treatment, it did not implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore did not require a showing of state action. See id.
at 757-60. This analysis would not apply under § 1985(3) because § 1985(3) explicitly
offers protection only in cases where the right to equal protection has been infringed.
219 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
=0 Id. at 96-97.
221 Id. at 97.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 100-01 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 192, at app. 141 (Representative
Shank's statement: "I do not want to see [this measure] so amended that there shall be
taken out of it the frank assertion of the power of the national Government to protect
life, liberty, and property, irrespective of the act of the State.")).
22' Griffin, 403 U.S. at 103 ("[Tlhe conduct here alleged lied so close to the core of
the coverage intended by Congress that it is hard to conceive of wholly private conduct
that would come within the statute if this does not.").
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passing.21 5 The defendants mistakenly believed that the car con-
tained a civil rights worker.226 They forced the men out of the
car, clubbed them about the head and threatened them with
firearms.227 The plaintiffs brought suit under section 1985(3), al-
leglng a conspiracy to deprive them of the equal protection of
state and federal laws, including their First Amendment free-
dom of speech, their Thirteenth Amendment right not to be en-
slaved, their right to due process and their right to travel the
public highways. 228 The Griffin Court articulated a four-part test
for claims under section 1985(3). The complaint must allege:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States.2 29
Only the second requirement is at issue here. In Griffin the
plaintiffs' claims of deprivation of Thirteenth Amendment rights
and deprivation of the right of interstate travel fulfilled the sec-
ond requirement.2 30 The Court then held that requiring racial
animus by the defendants as part of the cause of action would
limit the statute to only those cases with which the sponsors of
the Act were concerned.231
225 Id. at 90.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 90-91.
228 Id. at 91-92. Regarding the right to travel claim, the complaint alleged: "By their
conspiracy and acts pursuant thereto, the defendants have.., prevented the... plain-
tiffs . . .from enjoying and exercising . . .their rights to travel the public highways
without restraint in the same terms as white citizens in Kemper County, Mississippi
... "Id.
220 Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983) (interpreting Griffin, 403 U.S. at
102-03).
230 See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 104-05.
121 Id. at 101 ("That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, how-
ever, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with
the rights of others."). The Court was certain that the statute was meant to cover some
but not all private conspiracies. Id. Requiring racial animus was one way to insure that
the legislative intent of the statute was carried out. The Court also explained that the
conspiracy must also be aimed at the "deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights se-
cured by the law to all" and that it was not intended to punish an ordinary assault and
battery committed by two or more persons. Id. at 101-02. The Court showed its concern
that the statute would be read too broadly in light of its holding when it said that the
statute should not be interpreted as a general tort law. Id. While the Court tried to
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The Griffin Court found it necessary to identify a source of
congressional power to reach the private conspiracy under the
circumstances of the case.232 The Court determined that Con-
gress could create legislation to protect plaintiffs against the in-
fringement by private persons of the rights secured to them
under the Thirteenth Amendment.233
More difficult, however, was the question whether Congress
could provide a civil remedy for the violation of the right of in-
terstate travel by private parties. The Court found that the con-
stitutional right of interstate travel does exist, "does not neces-
sarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable
against private as well as governmental interference." 234 Thus, so
long as plaintiffs could prove that this right was meant to be
discriminatorily impaired by the conspiracy, the claim was
within the statute, and Congress had authority to reach the pri-
express its concerns over what the statute did not cover, it was unclear regarding what
the statute did cover. The Court did not attempt to remedy this vagueness until it de-
cided Carpenters in 1983.
1-1 Gormley, supra note 195, at 548.
The Court, under Griffin, had to be sure that Congress had the authority to create §
1985(3) to remedy the underlying deprivation for each separate deprivation that was
alleged. In other words, the Court had to identify separately the congressional authority
to create legislation that provided a remedy for a conspiracy to violate the Thirteenth
Amendment, the right to travel, or whatever deprivation the plaintiffs alleged.
I Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104-06.
In its terse discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Griffin Court used sweep-
ing language to express its certainty that section two of that amendment enabled Con-
gress to enact § 1985(3) as a means of redressing private discrimination. Id. at 105
("there has never been any doubt of the power of Congress to impose liability on private
persons under § 2 of that [the Thirteenth] amendment"). One of the cases cited by the
Court as authority for this proposition was Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). In Jones, the Court upheld, under the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
That statute guarantees all citizens the right to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property," 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988), and it originates from the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Jones, 392 U.S. at 422. In Jones the Court concluded that §
1982, in its original form, was meant to prohibit "all racially motivated deprivations of
the rights enumerated in the statute ..... Id. at 426. Jones is certainly ample authority
that Congress can enact legislation, pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, that is
aimed at redressing private discrimination. However, since Jones relied on the legislative
history of a different Act to determine that all racially motivated deprivations, private
and non-private, are redressable, the case does not offer any guidance on the question of
state action in § 1985(3) cases where the Thirteenth Amendment is not the source of the
underlying deprivation.
I Griffin, at 105-06. The Court relied on a cursory history of the right to travel to
conclude that the "right to pass freely from State to State has been recognized as among
the rights and privileges of National Citizenship" and that Congress can protect these
rights by appropriate legislation. Id. at 106.
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vate conduct through the statute.2 31
Because the Court did not characterize the substantive right
of interstate travel as arising from the Fourteenth Amendment,
the question remained whether state action was necessary for
1985(3) actions based on an asserted Fourteenth Amendment
right.236 The constitutional question whether Congress has the
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment2 37 to
reach purely private conspiracies was not considered by the
Court in Griffin.238 Specifically, the Court did not address
whether section 5 would allow Congress to go beyond imposing
duties on the state by allowing it to impose duties on private
individuals, thus creating new substantive equal protection
rights.23 9
In 1979 the Court began closing the door it had opened with
Griffin. The Court in Great American Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Novotny24° narrowed the scope of section 1985(3)
when it held that the statute was remedial and did not create
new substantive rights. Labeling the statute as remedial implied
23 Id. Thus, Congress had authority to create a statute imposing civil liability on
those private persons who interfered with the right of interstate travel because the right
was protected by some undetermined portion of the Constitution other than the Four-
teenth Amendment.
234 See Comment, State Inaction and Section 1985(3): United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott, 71 IowA L. REV. 1271, 1282 (1986) [hereinafter
Inaction]; see also Shatz, supra note 204, at 920.
2'7 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
238 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107 ("[Tlhe allegations of the complaint in this case have not
required consideration of the scope of the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
11 If section 5 so authorized Congress, then section 1985(3) can be viewed as a
substantive statute protecting fourteenth amendment rights from wholly pri-
vate interference. Because substantive statutes themselves create rights, plain-
tiffs, in this case, would need only to allege deprivation of section 1985(3)
rights without relying on alternative rights. If, on the other hand, section 5
does not authorize Congress to create substantive statutory rights in further.
ance of fourteenth amendment goals, then section 1985(3) is a remedial statute
and thus merely sets forth the method of enforcing previously created rights,
Under this view, plaintiffs would have to identify the source of the right on
which they would rely.
Comment, Protected Rights and Classes Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 610 v. Scott, 17 CONN. L. REV. 165, 188 (1984).
2 0 Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff, who believed he was
fired for his support of female employees, could not use § 1985(3) to redress violations of
Title VII). The Court said that "Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it
merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates." Id. at 372.
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that state action was necessary in 1985(3) cases where the in-
fringed substantive right was protected only against state action,
because section 1985(3) cannot grant a wider cause of action
against private actors than permitted by the constitutional pro-
vision conferring the substantive right.24'
The implication in Novotny became the express holding of
the Court when, in Carpenters v. Scott, it finally articulated the
necessity for state action in certain section 1985(3) claims.242
The plaintiffs in Carpenters were two nonunion employees of a
construction company who were assaulted by a group of protes-
ters consisting of union members angered by the construction
company's hiring practices.243 Plaintiffs' 1985(3) claim specifi-
cally asserted that the conspiracy was aimed at depriving them
of their First Amendment rights.244 One of the reasons used by
the Court in its holding that the plaintiffs had not made out a
claim under section 1985(3) was that the plaintiffs had not
proved involvement by the state.2 "
The Carpenters Court recognized that section 1985(3)
reaches some private conspiracies, 24 6 but the Court found that a
claimed deprivation of certain rights requires state involvement.
The plaintiffs were trying to claim that the denial of their First
Amendment rights was in turn a deprivation of the equal protec-
tion of the laws within the meaning of section 1985(3). The First
Amendment is directly aimed at Congress and has been ex-
tended to apply to states through the Fourteenth Amend-
241 Novotny said that § 1985(3) only provides a remedy for the violation of certain
rights already protected elsewhere. As such, it cannot be read to create new substantive
rights, and it cannot provide a remedy when the asserted right has not been violated.
Therefore, Novotny implies that plaintiffs who invoke § 1985(3) as a remedy for a viola-
tion of rights protected only against state infringement (for example rights found within
the Fourteenth Amendment) must show that the state was somehow involved in the
violation. Otherwise, the underlying substantive right, for which § 1985(3) is supposed to
provide the remedy, has not been violated. See Inaction, supra note 236, at 1284 (agree-
ing that Novotny implies state action will be necessary in certain § 1985(3) cases and
finding that most circuits following the Novotny decision required a showing of some
level of state action in 1985(3) cases).
242 Carpenters, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
242 Id. at 828.
s" Id. at 830.
245 Id.
242 Id. at 832-33 ("[Griffin] held that § 1985(3) reaches purely private conspiracies
and, as so interpreted, was not invalid on its face or as there applied .... Section
1985(3) constitutionally can and does protect [the rights protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment and the right to travel] from interference by purely private conspiracies.").
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ment.241 7 The Fourteenth Amendment is specifically designed to
protect individuals against state action, not against wrongs done
by other individuals.24 8 The Court then reasoned that:
Had § 1985(3) in so many words prohibited conspiracies to deprive
any person of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment, it would be untenable to contend that either of those
provisions could be violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow
involve or affect a State.2 4 9
Thus, the Court concluded that plaintiffs could not make out a
conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights without proof of
state involvement.250
The Second Circuit itself recently applied this reasoning in
New York State National Organization for Women (N. 0. W.) v.
Terry." ' In that case the plaintiffs claimed that section 1985(3)
was violated when the defendants, abortion protesters, blocked
access to abortion clinics. 25 2 The plaintiffs specifically alleged
the defendants had conspired to deprive them of the right of
interstate travel and the right to obtain an abortion. The court,
correctly applying the standards set out by Griffin and
Carpenters, found for the plaintiffs on the interstate travel
claim because "[t]he right of interstate travel is guaranteed by
the Constitution," and "[d]eprivations of that right are actiona-
ble under § 1985(3) with no need to show any state action or
involvement. 25 3 The court however chose not to reach the mer-
" Id. at 831.
248 Id.
249 Id.
210 Id. at 832. For a recent court of appeals application of Carpenters, see Lewis v.
Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1990), where the court said: "To determine
whether [the plaintiff] must plead state action in order to prosecute her claim under
Section 1985(3), . . . we must look not to the statute itself but rather to the nature of
the underlying constitutional right that she seeks to assert through the statute." Id. at
321. In Lewis, plaintiff's underlying right was the right to choose whether to continue her
pregnancy; this choice has its source in the rights of privacy and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Eighth Circuit found that, since "Appellees cite no Supreme Court or appel-
late cases limiting these rights to protect against only official conduct,. . . we decline to
place any such limitation on them here." Id. at 322. The dissent did point out that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals only against governmental interference, and
therefore under Carpenters, the plaintiff needed to show state action. Id. at 326.
251 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
22 Id. at 1344.
292 Id. at 1360. The N.O.W. court did not explain why state action was unnecessary.
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its of the plaintiffs' claim that the right to obtain an abortion
had been infringed by the conspiracy.25' It recognized that
"[w]hen the asserted constitutional deprivation is based upon a
right guaranteed against government interference - for example
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment - plaintiffs must
demonstrate some 'state involvement.' "255 Furthermore, the dis-
trict court had ruled that because the abortion right comes from
the right to privacy which is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment, the plaintiffs were required to show state involve-
ment.256 The district court held that plaintiffs had met this re-
quirement, but the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to reach
this question since it found for plaintiffs on the travel claim.25 7
Thus, the Second Circuit in N.O.W. v. Terry recognized the
necessity for state action in a section 1985(3) claim when the
deprived right is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court undertook that analysis in N.O.W. v. Terry even though it
never had to reach the question. Yet, in Spencer, when this
analysis was crucial and, as this Comment argues, determinative
of the outcome, the court failed to address the state action re-
quirement adequately.
4. Spencer v. Casavilla
Under Griffin v. Breckenridge there are four requirements
Instead, for support the court cited to Supreme, Court cases that" 'firmly' establish [the]
right of interstate travel 'is assertable against private as well as govermental interfer-
ence.'" Id. (citing Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-33; Novotny, 442 U.S. at 383 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06).
Id. at 1361.
25 Id. at 1358.
2" New York State Nat'1 Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see Lewis v. Pearson Found., Incb., 908 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990); see
also note 259 supra.
The Fourth Circuit, in its treatment of a factually similar case, cited the Second
Circuit's decision in N.O.W. as support for allowing § 1985(3) claims where abortion
protesters have infringed on the right to interstate travel N.O.W. v. Operation Recue,
914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexindria, 111 S. Ct.
1070 (1991). This case, which is now pending, represents the chance for the Supreme
Court to clarify the confusion surrounding § 1985(3) and the right to travel However,
since the Bray case seems more concerned with the issue of gender-based animus as a
possible substitute for racial animus in § 1985(3) cases, 914 F.2d at 585, and since the
case did not deal with intrastate travel, see id., there is little likelihood that Bray will
clarify the § 1985(3) right to travel confusion.
257 N.O.W., 886 F.2d at 1361. The Second Circuit agreed that the requirement would
have to be met.
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to be met by a claim under section 1985(3).268 In Spencer the
plaintiff's claim that the right of intrastate travel was infringed
by the defendants was asserted to fulfill the second requirement:
that the conspiracy deprived plaintiffs of the equal protection or
privileges and immunities of the laws.259 In order to do this,
"[t]he plaintiff must locate a right independently secured by
state or federal law .... "260 The Spencers asserted that the de-
cedent's federally protected right of intrastate travel was di-
rectly infringed by the defendants' conduct. There are two types
of federally guaranteed rights that can be used in the section
1985(3) context. The first is a federally guaranteed right that is
secured only against governmental interference. If plaintiffs are
asserting infringement of this type, then the defendants must be
state actors or actors seeking to influence the state to act in a
prohibited way.2" If, on the other hand, the federally guaran-
teed right is secured to all without the requirement of govern-
mental interference, then the conspiracy can be entirely pri-
vate.26 2 If, as this Comment has concluded, the source of the
right of intrastate travel is the Fourteenth Amendment,2 3 then
the Spencers alleged the deprivation of a right protected only
against governmental interference, and therefore they needed to
demonstrate state action.
In Spencer the Second Circuit failed to examine the state
action requirement adequately. First, the court lumped the right
of intrastate travel with the right of interstate travel, without
pointing to a constitutional source for either.264 Then the court
"' See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
289 See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983).
Although neither the district court nor the Second Circuit in their consideration of
Spencer explained how the plaintiffs fulfilled the other three requirements of § 1985(3),
the facts demonstrated that the requirements were met. First, the conspiracy element
can be inferred from the fact that the six white youths acted together when they drove in
four cars following Spencer as he tried to escape on his bicycle and that the four defend-
ants acted together when they beat him. See Spencer, 903 F.2d at 175. The facts demon.
strate an abundance of acts in furtherance of this conspiracy that fulfill the third re-
quirement. See id. Lastly, fulfilling the fourth requirement, Spencer and the plaintiffs
suffered obvious injury since the attack resulted in Spencer's death. See id.




I" See notes 188-91 and accompanying text supra.
2" See Spencer, 903 F.2d at 174.
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found that state action was not required when the right to travel
is the right protected by section 1985(3).25 The Second Circuit's
analysis simply relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin
v. Breckenridge, which upheld the use of the right to travel
without a showing of state involvement in a section 1985(3)
claim.266 The court seemed to reason that, since Griffin did not
require state involvement, state involvement need not be shown
by the Spencers. However, Griffin is distinguishable as an inter-
state travel case, 6 7 and thus the Second Circuit should have
conducted an analysis to decide which provision of the Constitu-
tion guarantees the right of intrastate travel. Only then could
the court determine if state involvement was a necessary compo-
nent of the action.
Since Griffin, the state action issue had become inseparably
linked to the question of congressional authority to create a pri-
vate conspiracy statute.266 However, when Carpenters held that
state action was required for section 1985(3) claims which al-
leged the deprivation of rights protected only against the state,
the Court relieved lower courts of the burden of pointing to the
congressional authority for the statute in every case. The Court
in Carpenters was responding to the overexpansion of the stat-
ute triggered by the Griffin decision. Federal courts after 1971
were expanding section 1985(3) greatly beyond its original scope
and were ignoring the warning of its drafters.6 9 The Griffin
Court itself warned that the statute should not become a general
federal tort law. 270 Also, requiring lower courts to identify the
congressional authority for the statute in each case was a heavy
burden to place on courts that usually do not conduct such ex-
'2' Id.
SId.
The Court in Griffin dealt with an interstate travel case and indicated that the
source for the right to travel is not necessarily the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin, 403
U.S. 88, 105 (1971). However, the source of a right of intrastate travel may be solely the
Fourteenth Amendment. See notes 117-91 and accompanying text supra.
26 See note 232 and accompanying text supra.
269 Gormley, supra note 195, at 557 (citing Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d
206 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated per curiam, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (found actionable §
1985(3) claim where conspiracy was aimed at environmentalists); Azar v. Conley, 456
F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972) (found actionable § 1985(3) claim where conspiracy was aimed
at members of a single family)).
270 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101 ('That the statute was meant to reach private action
does not, however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial in-
terferences with the rights of others.").
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tensive constitutional analyses. As a result, Carpenters repre-
sented a narrowing of the scope of the statute.2  It is now clear
that section 1985(3) protects only certain rights from purely pri-
vate encroachment,212 while others will require a showing of
state involvement.
According to the Court in Carpenters, "Griffin did not hold
that even when the alleged conspiracy is aimed at a right that is
by definition a right only against state interference the plaintiff
in a section 1985(3) suit nevertheless need not prove that the
conspiracy contemplated state involvement of some sort. 2 7 4 In
other words, if the right alleged is protected against more than
state interference, the plaintiff need not allege state involve-
ment, but conversely if the right is designed solely to protect
against infringements by the state, state involvement is re-
quired. The Carpenters Court explained that in Griffin it upheld
the use of the interstate travel right in a purely private conspir-
acy because the conspiracy had been aimed at interfering with
rights constitutionally protected against private, as well as offi-
cial, encroachment. 7 5 Restated, this implies that the right of in-
terstate travel does not come from a provision in the Constitu-
tion aimed solely at the state. The Court in Griffin determined
that the source of the right to travel was something other than
the Fourteenth Amendment (without determining the actual
source) in order to show that state action was not a necessary
part of the claim. Thus, in every 1985(3) claim, the court should
determine from where the federally claimed right originates so
that it can decide whether or not state action must be alleged.
The Second Circuit should have conducted an analysis of
the right to travel and determined the source of the right of in-
trastate travel. This Comment asserts that the most likely
source is the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
court then should have applied the Carpenters reasoning. Under
171 Inaction, supra note 236, at 1272 ("After [Carpenters], the use of section 1985(3)
has been drastically foreclosed as a remedy against private conspiracies .. ").
272 Specifically, § 1985(3) protects against private conspiracies that infringe on the
right to travel interstate and the Thirteenth Amendment, because those rights are inde-
pendent of state action.
273 Conspiracies aimed at the deprivation of rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment will require a showing of state involvement. See Inaction, supra note 236, at
1274.




Carpenters, the Supreme Court determined that Congress could
not reach a purely private violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Because there was no showing of state involvement, the
Spencers' claim should have been dismissed.76 While it is possi-
ble that Carpenters has narrowed the scope of the statute too
much, the Second Circuit cannot refuse to address what is
clearl the controlling precedent.
The consequence of Spencer is that now any tort, commit-
ted by two or more persons against someone of a different race,
can give rise to a claim in federal court. It is clear that the draft-
ers of the statute and the Supreme Court since Griffin wanted to
avoid this outcome. Yet Spencer has broadened the statute once
again. The Spencers can now bring what is essentially an ordi-
nary state tort claim in federal court. Given the desire to limit
the number of cases that qualify for federal jurisdiction in order
to lighten the burden on the federal courts, this outcome is un-
desirable. Furthermore, denying federal jurisdiction in cases
276 A dismissal of the Spencers' claim would be disturbing, however, since the ra-
cially animated conduct that gave rise to Spencer is precisely the type of evil the statute
was designed to remedy. Perhaps the Spencers could claim that the failure of the police
to protect the decedent constitutes state action. See Inaction, supra note 236 (arguing
that state inaction fulfills the state action requirement and is what the drafters of §
1985(3) had in mind). However, this argument seems rather weak.
Another possibility for the Spencers is to use § 1985(3) to assert a deprivation of
state law rights. This kind of § 1985(3) claim is a "type two" claim under the types
advanced by Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 1988). See note 20 supra.
Such a claim would assert that a right secured by state law was deprived by the conspir-
acy with the proper racially motivated animus. The claim must further allege that the
deprivation of the state right was designed to and did in fact interfere with the victims'
exercise of a federally created right. Stevens gives as an example a cros-burning, which
violates state trespass and assault laws, that is designed to prevent the victims from
exercising their rights to speak, associate and vote. 855 F.2d at 404. In Spencer, the
federal right could be the right to intrastate travel, and if alleged as a type two claim, the
plaintiffs would not need to show state action. See Gormley, supra note 195, at 561.
However, the Supreme Court chose not to address the viability of this type of claim in
Carpenters. 463 U.S. 825, 833-34 (The Court recognized that the lower court had failed
to consider plaintiffs' claim that their state law rights had been infringed by the conspir-
acy but found it unnecessary to remand for this issue since it found that plaintiffs' claim
was otherwise lacking because it did not show racial or class.based animus.).
Lastly, the Spencers might still have a § 1985(3) claim for the infringement of their
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Second Circuit chose not to deal with this
claim since it found for plaintiffs on their other claim. Spencer, 903 F.2d at 176. Griffin
represents solid authority upholding a § 1985(3) claim alleging the violation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Griffin, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971). For a further discussion of the
Thirteenth Amendment see notes 203 and 233 and accompanying text supra.
The 1988 increase of the amount in controversy from $10,000 to S50,000 in order
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such as Spencer would not work a terrible injustice because
these plaintiffs have recourse in state court and still may have
successful federal claims.278
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's failure to point to a constitutional
source for the right of intrastate travel led to the erroneous con-
clusion that section 1985(3) was available to the plaintiffs. Since
this Comment determined that the most likely source of the
right of intrastate travel is the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, the infringement of the right could not be as-
serted against purely private -actors. Spencer sets a dangerous
precedent which could allow section 1985(3) to become the
source of federal jurisdiction for claims that were not meant to
be encompassed by the statute.
Karin Fromson Segall
to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction is an example of recent attempts to ease the
case load of federal courts. The increasing use of magistrates for discovery and other
matters in the federal system demonstrates as well that the federal courts are stretched
to the limit. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
78 See note 276 supra.
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